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The recent rise of shareholder engagement has revamped companies’ 
corporate governance structures so as to empower shareholder rights and to 
constrain managerial opportunism. Notwithstanding the general trend, this 
Article uncovers corporate spin-off transactions—which divide a single 
company into two or more companies—as a unique mechanism that insulates the 
management from shareholder intervention. In a spin-off, the company’s 
managers can fundamentally change the governance arrangements of the new 
spun-off company without being subject to monitoring mechanisms, such as 
shareholder approval or market check. Those changes often empower managers 
over shareholders. Furthermore, most spin-off transactions enjoy tax 
benefits. The potential agency problems associated with the managers’ unilateral 
governance changes can be further compounded when the managers 
adopt multiple classes of common stock with unequal voting rights (“dual-class 
stock”) in the new spun-off company without shareholder approval. 
This is the first Article to systematically examine the problem from both 
corporate and tax law perspectives and to offer possible solutions. The Article 
argues that when the managers’ unilateral governance changes are substantial, 
certain adjustments to corporate and tax laws may be necessary to curb 
managerial opportunism. For instance, under corporate law, when spin-off 
transactions accompany a charter amendment, shareholder approval, either at the 
state law level or company charter level, can be mandated. In addition, tax law 
can revisit the “continuity of interest” requirement to evaluate whether material 
changes in shareholder voting rights can disqualify certain spin-offs from tax-
free treatment. The Article will also present new insights into the long-standing 
debate on dual-class stock by showing how the perceived risk of dual-class stock 
can be magnified when combined with spin-off transactions. 
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 Suppose A, B, C, and D share one pepperoni pizza. Each paid exactly one 
quarter of the pizza price and all equally like pepperoni. Suppose A was in 
charge of dividing the pizza evenly. Initially the pizza was cut in four slices, 
but A thought each pizza slice was too big to hold and cut each slice further 
in half without asking the others. Now the pizza is cut in eight identically-
sized slices. The pepperoni toppings were relatively evenly-distributed when 
the pizza was sliced in four, but not anymore when sliced in eight because 
some of the toppings were bunched. A chose two pizza slices with the most 
pepperoni toppings, and B, C, and D got two slices each with visibly less 
pepperoni toppings than A’s slices. Given the situation, B, C, and D all claim 
that A’s decision to cut the pizza into eight slices resulted in unequal 
distribution of the pizza. Specifically, they argue that A should have asked for 
B, C, and D’s agreement before the division. Alternatively, they say that A 
should pay more for the pizza because A got more pepperoni toppings. Should 
dividing the pizza into the same number of equally-sized slices but with 
different toppings be treated as an equal distribution of the pizza? Or, should 
A pay more because of getting more toppings? Would it be different if A got 
approval from the others to divide in that way?  
 This division of pepperoni pizza provides a hypothetical, somewhat 
sophomoric, but perhaps serves as a useful lens to understand the current real-
world issue associated with corporate spin-offs. This Article criticizes that 
neither corporate law nor tax law properly addresses the new phenomenon of 
“proportional in number of stock (i.e., same number of equal-sized pizza 
slices) but differential in benefit attached to the stock (i.e., different amount 
of toppings on each pizza slice)” problem arising from corporate spin-offs. 
Both laws have rarely considered the differences in rights attached to stock as 
long as the distributed number of stock is “pro-rata” to stock ownership. The 
Article argues that the rights attached to stock should be taken into account in 
evaluating spin-offs in order to prevent opportunistic management insulation 
from shareholder intervention.  
A corporate spin-off divides a company into more than two independent 
public companies.1 As a result, it creates a new spun-off public company 
(“SpinCo”) by distributing the new company’s stock to the parent company 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, SPIN-OFF GUIDE 1 (2018) [hereinafter 
WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE], http://www.wlrk.com/files/2018/SpinOffGuide.pdf. For a 
detailed timeline for a spin-off transaction, see Paul Hammes et al., Tax-Free Spin-off 
Roadmap, https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-tax-free-spin-off-
roadmap/$FILE/EY-tax-free-spin-off-roadmap.pdf.  
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(“ParentCo”)’s existing shareholders in the form of dividends proportionally 
to their stock ownership. A spin-off offers unfettered discretion for managers. 
On the one hand, unlike an Initial Public Offering (“IPO”), i.e., the very first 
sale of a new company’s stock to the public, a new SpinCo does not need to 
worry about the market reaction to the SpinCo’s various features including 
governance arrangements. This is because the SpinCo stock is internally 
distributed to the existing ParentCo’s shareholders.2 On the other hand, a 
spin-off has been consistently treated as a way to distribute dividends to 
ParentCo’s shareholders, which is within managers’ discretion under current 
corporate law. Thus, ParentCo’s managers can decide whether, when, and 
how to make dividends through the form of a spin-off without shareholder 
approval.3 An important assumption for such lack of shareholder approval in 
a spin-off is that there are no fundamental changes to shareholder rights 
before and after the spin-off. Furthermore, the same assumption of mere 
change in forms of ownership also functions as a basis for tax-free benefit for 
spin-offs. The recent practice, however, shows that the consequences of spin-
off may be far more transformative than a simple dividend distribution.4  
 For illustration, when managers of ConocoPhillips (ParentCo) separated 
its refining business into a stand-alone public company called Phillips 66 
(SpinCo) through a spin-off transaction in 2012, they also had full discretion 
                                                 
2 See infra Part I.B.1. For instance, while each shareholder can trade the SpinCo stock 
individually on the market later on, the individual shareholder rather than the SpinCo will 
bear the costs of potentially entrenching governance arrangements. In that sense, managers 
who initially design the SpinCo’s governance arrangements have little incentive to optimize 
them.  
3 See infra Part I.B.2. While corporate law defers spin-off decisions to directors, the 
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) substantially oversees spin-offs through Form 10 
registration statement filings pursuant to Section 12(b) or (g) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. Since spin-offs involve the issuance of new stock, SpinCo must file Form 10, a 
registration form for spin-offs, with the SEC. See 17 CFR 240.12b or 240.12g. The typical 
SEC review process begins with SpinCo’s submission of its initial Form 10 filing with the 
SEC. The SEC generally provides comments within 30 days of an initial Form 10 filing. The 
Form 10 will not be declared effective by the SEC until SpinCo has responded to all 
comments and the responses have been cleared by the SEC. See WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, 
supra note 1, at 41. The SEC’s oversight, however, does not effectively extend to corporate 
governance issues. While Form 10 filings submitted to the SEC contain SpinCo’s charters 
as exhibits, the SEC also—even more than typical court—tends to defer the optimal 
corporate governance arrangements to managers of each company. 
4 See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Agents Protecting Agents: An Empirical 
Study of Takeover Defenses in Spinoffs, Working Paper (2004), at 3 [hereinafter Agents 
Protecting Agents] (“Comparing spinoffs to their parent firms, we find that spinoffs tend to 
have more takeover protection than their parents and that entrenchment of spinoff 
management is costly to parent shareholders.”); WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE supra note 1, 
at 22. (“In many spin-offs and IPOs, the spin-off company has more antitakeover provisions 
in its charter and bylaws than the parent.”).  
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to adopt an initial corporate charter for Phillips 66. The SpinCo’s charter was 
modeled after ParentCo’s charter provisions almost verbatim. On top of those 
identical provisions, the managers added a charter provision allowing a 
staggered board of directors in the new SpinCo. 5  The adoption of the 
staggered board—a powerful defensive device for management—went in the 
opposite direction of the recent mainstream trend of eliminating staggered 
boards in other public companies. 6  More notably, the adoption of the 
staggered board provision for the SpinCo was subject to neither shareholder 
approval nor market-pricing checks.7 Also, the spin-off transaction was able 
to avoid paying taxes on the built-in gain in Phillips 66, which would have 
been imposed if ConocoPhillips simply sold its refining business instead of 
spinning it off.8 As such, the spin-off transaction provided an extraordinarily 
counterintuitive opportunity for Phillips 66, which became a new stand-alone 
public company, to adopt the effective anti-takeover provision without 
shareholder approval or market checks. This opportunity also allowed 
Phillips66 to enjoy juicy tax-free benefits. As shown in the Phillips 66 
example, empirical data has suggested that managers tend to stretch their 
discretion in spin-offs even to set governance arrangements in a way to 
empower themselves over shareholders and to make them less accountable to 
shareholders.9  
Does this phenomenon conform to the assumption that there are no 
fundamental changes before and after the spin-off? If ParentCo’s managers 
add a new provision affecting the allocation of power between shareholders 
                                                 
5 See AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF PHILLIPS 66, Fifth 
A. (May 2, 2012); AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF 
CONOCOPHILLIPS, Fifth A. (Jul. 28, 2008). 
6  See, e.g., Erik Krusch, Corporate Governance: Staggered U.S. Boards Are 
Endangered Species, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-
regulatory-forum/2011/03/23/corporate-governance-staggered-u-s-boards-are-endangered-
species/ (“The overwhelming trend in corporate governance is towards the declassification 
of boards and this year is no exception, with several shareholder proposals calling for 
declassification making their way onto 2011 proxies.”). 
7 See infra Part I.B.1.  
8 See Anna Driver, Conoco Board Approves Spin-off of Refining Unit, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 
2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-conocophillips/conoco-board-approves-spin-off-
of-refining-unit-idUSBRE83318820120404.   
9 Adopting anti-takeover provisions in SpinCo’s corporate charter, such as a staggered 
board, is a good example of the governance rearrangements. A recent empirical study on 
corporate opportunity waivers shows that managers tend to opt out of the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty when they have an option to waive the duty. The corporate opportunity waivers are 
common in SpinCo particularly when multiple ParentCo managers also sit on SpinCo. See, 
e.g., Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: 
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075–1152 
(2017). 
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and managers into a SpinCo’s charter, the change is not likely a mere 
distribution anymore. The assumption for special treatment for spin-offs is 
under attack. Going back to the pizza analogy, it might be the distribution of 
the same number of equal-sized pizza slices (i.e., proportional number of 
stock) to stakeholders, but managers who decide to separate the pizza (i.e., 
ParentCo managers) unevenly allocate pepperoni toppings (e.g., differential 
voting rights) and take the most lucrative pieces. Such governance changes 
through corporate charters are considered fundamental changes to the 
companies, and shareholder approval is necessary in all cases—except in 
spin-offs. 
The current procedural privilege for spin-offs, which enables managers’ 
unilateral governance changes, raises concerns about potential managerial 
entrenchment. It seems that the lack of a monitoring mechanism for 
governance changes over spin-offs would facilitate the managers’ 
opportunistic governance changes and thus increases agency costs out of 
entrenchment. Even when managers implement anti-takeover provisions in a 
SpinCo to advance shareholder value, this legitimate incentive does not 
necessarily justify the elimination of a checking mechanism due to the 
rigidity of corporate charters. State corporate laws require mutual consent 
between managers and shareholders to amend corporate charters, so that 
neither shareholders nor managers can change corporate charters 
unilaterally.10 Thus, once ParentCo managers implement an anti-takeover 
provision in a SpinCo’s charter, shareholders cannot take it off without 
managers’ consent. Because the efficiency of anti-takeover provisions is 
volatile as the company’s other features evolve (e.g., ownership structure, 
company age, or company size), an efficient anti-takeover provision at the 
time of the adoption would not be necessarily efficient ten years after the 
adoption. Because most anti-takeover provisions inherently have a self-
serving element to managers by securing their tenure on the board, the 
adoption of an “efficient-for-now” anti-takeover provision is always 
vulnerable to managerial entrenchment.11  
 The agency problems inherent in the managers’ unilateral governance 
changes described above can significantly be compounded when ParentCo’s 
managers adopt a dual-class stock structure in SpinCo’s charter without 
shareholder approval. Dual-class stock, which involves two or more classes 
of common stock with unequal voting rights, has been on rise. By adopting a 
dual-class stock structure, one class of shareholders receives a higher voting 
right per share than the others.12 Often times, trading high-vote stock on the 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2014). 
11 See infra Part II.A.1.  
12  For instance, the voting rights ratio between Facebook’s Class A and Class B 
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market is even prohibited by corporate charters. Thus, dual-class stock is one 
of the most effective tactics for a small number of insiders to retain corporate 
control without corresponding equity interests. 13  As shareholder voting 
remains the primary tool for incorporating shareholders’ voice into corporate 
decisions, any deviation from the one-share-one-vote standard (e.g., by 
adopting dual-class stock structure) is required to be explicitly set forth in the 
company’s charter.14 Nevertheless, as this Article reveals, a spin-off offers 
leeway for managers to switch to the dual-class structure post-IPO stage. The 
adoption of dual-class stock through spin-off not only bypasses the 
shareholder approval requirement for a charter amendment under corporate 
law, but it also overrides the rules of the major stock exchanges that prohibit 
a post-IPO switch from a one-share-one-vote principle to dual-class stock 
except through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).15  
 As such, ParentCo managers’ unilateral governance changes through a 
SpinCo charter are likely to make fundamental changes to a company before 
and after the spin-off. These changes should not be eligible for special 
treatment (i.e., no shareholder approval) under corporate law.  
 The deviation from the assumption of no fundamental changes before 
and after the spin-off also has significant implications for tax law treatment 
of spin-offs. The reason that tax law offers a tax-free benefit to certain spin-
offs is that if a corporate reorganization through spin-offs is a mere change in 
form and yet more efficient for the business, tax law will facilitate such 
transactions by deferring tax liability that should have been imposed on the 
separating transaction.16 The tax benefit is so attractive that the popularity of 
                                                 
stockholders is 1:10. Mark Zuckerberg and a small group of insiders of insiders hold Class 
B high vote stock. See AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF 
FACEBOOK, INC., Article IV.3.2. (Jun. 20, 2016). 
13 Facebook’s Class B stockholders including Mark Zuckerberg own approximately 18% 
of the company’s share, but control nearly 70% of the voting power. See Bob Pisani, 
Shareholders Won’t Force Zuckerberg’s Hand in Facebook Management, CNBC (Mar. 21, 
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/20/shareholders-wont-force-zuckerbergs-hand-in-
facebook-management.html.  
14 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 212(a) (“Unless otherwise provided in the 
certificate of incorporation…each stockholder shall be entitled to 1 vote for each share of 
capital stock held by such stockholder.”); Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. §7.21(a) (“[U]nless 
the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, each outstanding share, regardless of class or 
series, is entitled to one vote on each matter voted on at a shareholders’ meeting.”). 
15 NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 313.00 (1992); NASDAQ Stock Market Rule 
5640. Public companies cannot amend their charters to adopt dual-class stock even when 
their shareholders approve it without giving up their inclusion on major stock exchanges. 
16 Legislative history and Treasury Regulations explain that the purpose of the tax-free 
treatment of reorganization transactions is to make exceptions from the general rule for 
certain “readjustments of corporate structures . . . as are required by business exigencies” 
and “which effect only a readjustment of the shareholder’s continuing interest in property 
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corporate spin-offs largely derives directly from the tax-free benefit status of 
the spin-off. While tax-free benefits are not the only or primary reason for 
corporate spin-offs, spin-offs are often conditioned on their tax-free status.17 
In that sense, the dynamic of corporate spin-offs cannot be accurately 
understood without considering the element of taxation. However, if the 
governance changes during spin-offs are considered to be fundamental 
changes of the company, it is hard to justify tax-free benefits for those spin-
offs. Nonetheless, current tax law fails to scrutinize the problem, which this 
Article aims to address.   
This Article does not claim that managers’ discretion regarding a 
corporate spin-off in general should be constrained. Rather, it highlights the 
potential risks of unconstrained managerial discretion over governance 
arrangements during spin-offs, which deviates from the initial intent of both 
corporate and tax legislation on the issue. Also, given the increasing 
popularity of both corporate spin-offs and dual-class stock issuances in recent 
years,18 the adoption of dual-class stock in corporate spin-offs seems likely 
to expand. As the first academic paper that provides a cooperative analysis of 
both corporate law and tax law issues in spin-offs, this Article not only 
reveals a new practice largely ignored by previous literature, but also 
contributes to multiple strands of academic literature.  
First, it adds another important, but underdiscussed, specific situation 
that expands the managers’ tendency to exercise their discretion to advance 
their own benefits over shareholders’ to the situations brought out by the prior 
literature.19 Second, because the Article examines spin-offs together with 
dual-class stock, it connects with the current, sometimes heated debate on 
whether dual-class stock is conducive to shareholder value. 20  Amid the 
raging debate over dual-class stock, however, both supporters and opponents 
                                                 
under modified corporate forms.” For acquisitive reorganizations, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, see Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b); for divisive reorganization, such as spin-off, see 
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 
at 337 (1987) and Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1).  
17 See infra Part I.C.1. 
18 See, e.g., WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1 (“The volume of spin-offs in 
2017 increased slightly from 2016 to approximately $132 billion.”); Andrea Tan & Benjamin 
Robertson, Dual-Class Shares Are Coming Under Fire-Again, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sep. 27, 
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-27/can-democracy-stage-a-
comeback-at-stock-exchanges (“One percent of U.S. IPOs had weighted voting rights in 
2005, according to Sutter Securities Inc. in San Francisco; a decade later 15 percent did, with 
technology companies making up more than half the total.”). 
19 See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 9 (discussing managers tendency in the context 
of waiving fiduciary duty of loyalty); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and 
Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1549–1595 (2010) (critizing managerial opportunism in 
a bunded shareholder approval of a merger itself and a new corporate charter.). 
20 See infra Part II.B.  
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pay little attention to the situation where managers can unilaterally adopt 
dual-class stock or change existing voting rights for each class, specifically 
through corporate spin-offs.  
Third, this Article updates the tax law literature on the “continuity of 
interest” requirement in spin-offs that has not been reviewed since the early 
2000s. The continuity of interest doctrine requires that shareholders of 
ParentCo continue their proprietary interest in SpinCo more than at a certain 
level. Along with other requirements for tax-free spinoffs, this requirement 
is supposed to guarantee that the spin-off is a mere change in corporate forms. 
However, the continuity of interest requirement fails to review whether spin-
offs with significant governance changes could still be viewed as mere 
changes in form and thus deserving of tax-free benefits. This Article offers 
critiques on current rules from a policy and legal perspective. Furthermore, 
this Article advances the debate on the efficacy and merit of current tax law 
influencing corporate governance and agency costs.  
Finally, this Article argues that the current legal regime regarding spin-
offs fails to address potential agency problems, specifically when a SpinCo 
adopts dual-class stock and proposes possible incentives or deterrents in 
important policy implications both to corporate and tax law. Specifically, it 
proposes that corporate law should consider a shareholder approval 
requirement for spin-offs that are sizable, or that substantially amend a 
SpinCo charter. At the same time, tax law needs to revisit the continuity of 
interest requirement to evaluate to what extent a spin-off involving 
governance changes can be treated as a tax-free (or tax-deferred) transaction. 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I overviews the legal rules on spin-
offs in both corporate and tax law. It explains how spin-offs may be executed 
without shareholder approval and how spin-offs enjoy tax-free benefits. Part 
II shows that adopting dual-class stock via spin-off may exacerbate agency 
problems incurred by unilateral governance changes before and after the spin-
off. It also explains why this phenomenon raises normative and doctrinal 
concerns about the associated tax-free benefits. In addition to theoretical 
analysis, it presents real-world examples demonstrating both corporate and 
tax problems. Part III urges lawmakers and/or companies to require 
shareholder approval as an enhanced shareholder monitoring mechanism for 
managers’ unilateral governance changes through spin-offs and to reconsider 
the continuity of interest requirement in the Pilot Program on spin-offs 
offered by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Part IV concludes. 
I. CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS AS TAX-FREE BUSINESS DECISION 
In this Part, we explain how corporate spin-offs differ from other types 
of corporate separations and to what extent managers have discretion in 
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shaping corporate governance arrangement for spun-off companies. We also 
show how spin-offs utilize tax-free benefits. Depending on the technique of 
corporate separation, legal constraints on managerial discretion vary 
significantly.  
A. Legal Boundaries of Spin-offs  
A corporate spin-off, where a single public company is divided into more 
than two stand-alone companies, is often regarded as the mirror image of a 
corporate merger. In contrast to the vigorous discussion on M&A issues, the 
volume of academic literature on corporate separations has been relatively 
thin. Prior studies on corporate separations were mainly conducted by 
financial economists focusing on the economic impacts of corporate break-
ups.21 Legal aspects of corporate separations have rarely been explored by 
academics, despite the increase in volume of corporate separations in 
practice.22 The scope of the term “spin-off” varies among academics, and it 
is crucial to define the scope of corporate spin-offs as distinct from other 
types of corporate separations.   
1. Definition of Spin-offs  
Unfortunately, the term corporate “spin-off” has been used inconsistently. 
In its broadest meaning, the term encompasses many different types of 
corporate separations.23 But more often a “spin-off” indicates only a specific 
type of corporate separation in a much narrower way. In this Article, a spin-
off refers to a transaction that distributes the entire stock of a spun-off 
company to shareholders of a parent company as dividends on a pro rata basis 
such that the shareholders of a parent company hold stock of both the parent 
and the spun-off companies (i.e., a typical 100% spin-off). This 100% spin-
off has become a typical form of corporate separation and the most widely 
used definition of corporate spin-offs. Corporate spin-offs are generally 
subject to business judgment rule protection and also eligible for tax-free 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Debra J. Aron, Using the Capital Market as a Monitor: Corporate Spinoffs 
in an Agency Framework, 22 RAND J. OF ECON. 505 (1991); Mehrotra L. Daley & R. 
Sivakumar, Corporate Focus and Value Creation Evidence from Spinoffs, 45(2) J. OF FIN. 
ECON. 257 (1997); Thomas J. Chemmanur et al., Antitakeover Provisions in Corporate Spin-
offs, 34 J. OF BANK. FIN. 813 (2010).  
22 See WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1 (“The volume of spin-offs in 2017 
increased slightly from 2016 to approximately $132 billion.”).  
23 For instance, in prior literature, the term “spin-off” referred either to an equity carve-
out which involves a public offering of SpinCo or to comprehensive corporate separations. 
See Daines & Klausner, Agents Protecting Agents, supra note 4 (discussing equity carve-out 
only.). 
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benefits.24 Before discussing the unique features of such transactions, it is 
worth discussing several common spin-off variants; an appreciation of the 
differences between these related transactions is critical.   
Since the purpose of this Article is to examine a unique and largely 
overlooked legal issue in corporate spin-offs, rather than to portray the 
complete landscape of corporate separations, this Article exclusively focuses 
on corporate spin-offs. Nevertheless, it is crucial to understand how corporate 
spin-offs differ from other types of corporate separations. After all, when 
these corporate spin-offs combine with public offerings or mergers as 
discussed below, the combination cures the lack of monitoring mechanism 
problem to some extent. 
The first type combines corporate spin-offs with a public sale: the “equity 
carve-out.” Because this transaction involves offering new securities to the 
public rather than a distribution to ParentCo’s existing body of shareholders, 
the separation is subject to the market checks applicable to Initial Public 
Offerings (“IPO”). In order to maximize the market price of the stock at its 
IPO, managers have incentive to minimize managerial opportunism in all 
aspects of the company. By contrast, a typical spin-off is not subject to this 
price mechanism. In addition to the market checks, corporate separation with 
public offerings can also be subject to shareholder approval. State corporate 
laws generally give managers as agents of a corporation power to sell 
corporate assests without shareholder approval. When a corporation sells “all 
or subtantially all” of its assets, the sale requires approval of a majority of the 
outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote. 25 Another type of 
corporate separation is a separation combined with a concurrent merger: the 
“spin-merger.” Typically in this case, after a spin-off, either SpinCo or 
ParentCo merges with a third party.26 When a parent company merges with a 
third party, the parent company’s shareholder approval is required to 
effectuate the merger. By contrast, when a spun-off company merges with a 
third party right after a spin-off, managers of a parent company can bypass 
getting the Spinco’s shareholders’ approval by getting shareholder approval 
before the spin-off. Spin-mergers are eligible for tax-free benefits under 
certain conditions.  
These two types of corporate separations must be conceptually 
distinguished from a typical spin-off, and they do not share the agency 
                                                 
24 For detailed tax-free benefits for spin-offs, see infra Part I.C. 
25 For instance, DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 122 (4) states, “Every corporation… shall 
have power… to sell… all or any of its property and assets . . .”, but the power is limited by 
the shareholder approval requirement for “all or substantially all” assets at DGCL Section 
271(a). 
26 Even among spin-mergers, when a SpinCo merger with a buyer before a ParentCo 
distributes stock, a spin-merger can bypass shareholder voting on the merger. See WACHTELL 
SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 10. 
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problems that arise in typical spin-offs. After all, equity carve-outs are subject 
to market checks, and spin-mergers are subject to shareholder approval. Each 
of these corporate separations are accountable to at least one monitoring 
mechanism, and managers’ discretion regarding the separation is thus limited 
to that extent. By contrast, managers can exercise greater discretion when 
they pursue a typical spin-off.   
2. Purpose of Spin-offs  
Corporations are not static; they dynamically transform over time. 
Multiple firms sometimes combine themselves into one, and at other times a 
single firm breaks up into pieces. Both corporate mergers (or “acquisitive 
reorganization” in tax terminology) and corporate separations27 (or “divisive 
reorganization”) demand sophisticated legal work throughout the process. 
While corporate mergers have been viewed as the pinnacle of sophisticated 
transactional techniques, corporate separations have received surprisingly 
little attention from legal academia. In general, a corporate separation is a 
complex deal, and it can be extremely difficult to identify the real motive 
driving the deal or to evaluate the impact of the deal.  
In most cases, however, a corporate separation is principally driven by a 
valid business purpose. In dividing one business into two or more entities, 
management pursues operational objectives (e.g., to enhance business focus), 
financial objectives (e.g., to use more appropriate capital structure), or both.28 
In addition to the principal business reasons, tax treatment is known to be one 
of the most crucial factors to consider. Most spin-offs have been using a 
format of distribution of SpinCo’s stock to shareholders of the parent 
company, and whether the stock distribution qualifies for tax-free dividends 
often serves as a prerequisite for completing spin-offs.29 Compared with tax 
consideration, the corporate governance implications of spin-offs have 
received little emphasis until the recent uptick in shareholder activism. As a 
rare opportunity to reform a company’s corporate governance arrangements 
in a direction management prefers, law firms have started advising companies 
to include management-empowering provisions in a governing document of 
SpinCo.30 
                                                 
27 We use the term “corporate separation” in its broadest meaning that embraces all kinds 
of divisive reorganizations including spin-offs, equity-carve outs, and split-ups.   
28 Id. at 3.  
29 For instance, in 2015, Yahoo called off a plan to spin-off its stake in Alibaba after the 
IRS refused to grant a tax-free blessing. See Yahoo Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 9, 
2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312515398244/d93711dex991.h
tm; see text accompanying infra notes 46–56.  
30 For a detailed discussion, see infra Part I.B.2.  
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All things considered, management’s ultimate goal in pursuing a spin-off, 
at least nominally, is always to increase shareholder value. It is, however, 
extremely difficult both to prove or rebut what really motivates such a move. 
Rather than there existing one predominant shareholder-friendly reason, it is 
more likely that multiple reasons are inseparably intertwined. Thus, this paper 
does not argue that certain spin-offs are solely driven by managers’ self-
interests in corporate governance changes. Rather, it claims that the current 
legal regime does not properly address the potential risk due to managers’ 
unfettered discretion in spin-offs used to significantly influence shareholder 
rights. Even in cases where a change in corporate governance remains a mere 
consequence of a spin-off, the protections afforded to managerial decisions 
by courts warrant concern, because it is extremely difficult for shareholders 
to reverse the change. 
B. Governance Changes Without Monitoring Mechanisms 
 Practitioners advising corporate managers tend to recommend adoption 
of anti-takeover provisions, such as a classified board, in a SpinCo’s 
corporate charter. 31  Because a SpinCo is relatively small in size and 
vulnerable to hostile takeovers, it needs anti-takeover provisions to protect 
itself from takeover attempts.32  The most unique trait of spin-offs is that the 
transaction is subject to neither express shareholder approval nor market 
check in adopting those anti-takeover provisions. In contrast, mergers and 
acquisitions require an express shareholder approval, either in terms of voting 
or through tender. Several mechanisms—primarily market pressures and 
shareholder approval—are, in principle, supposed to rein in management’s 
discretion by preventing transactions that are inefficient, wasteful, or whose 
benefits inure primarily to management’s interests rather than those of the 
shareholders. Also, in the case of an initial public offering or secondary 
offering, there exists a market pricing mechanism that determines the amount 
of proceeds the issuing corporation will receive. This can provide a 
meaningful market check against inefficient transactions. As discussed below, 
these mechanisms, while imperfect, have important consequences in many 
transactions; critically, however, they are absent or weak in the spin-off 
context.  
1. No Market Pricing Mechanism  
Traditional theory on the effect of anti-takeover provisions has argued 
that a company which goes on the market for the first time (i.e., IPO) is under 
                                                 
31 WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 22-25. 
32 Id.  
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pressure to minimize the number of anti-takeover provisions in its charter.33 
The theory assumes that anti-takeover provisions lower a firm’s stock price 
on the market because investors will be wary of the managers’ decreased 
accountability by insulating incumbent directors from potential challenges. 
Thus, companies that do go on to have an IPO have incentive to minimize the 
number of anti-takeover provisions to attract more investors. Subsequent 
empirical studies, however, have shown the puzzling phenomenon that many 
companies include anti-takeover provisions in their IPO charters anyway.34 
On the question of whether anti-takeover provisions in IPO charters were 
intended to benefit shareholders or managers, studies found mixed results.35  
As such, while the imperfect IPO pricing has its own limits in monitoring 
opportunistic adoption of anti-takeover provisions, at least investors in IPO 
firms are aware of the existence of anti-takeover charter provisions of the 
company. They may choose to purchase the stock despite these provisions 
because of the other overriding benefits. Also, the investors had an alternative 
option to purchase other stock. By contrast, a typical corporate spin-off does 
not have a public sale element and is not subject to any market pricing 
mechanism at all.  
More importantly, as the first public sale of stocks of a company, the IPO 
means that a company that raises capital through the issuance of stock and its 
management has a strong incentive to raise more money which will be a part 
of the company’s assets. By contrast, a corporate spin-off does not involve 
raising capital from new investors. Rather, it only divides a stock into more 
pieces for existing shareholders.36Accordingly management has little or no 
                                                 
33 See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 204-205 (1991). 
34 See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm 
Value?, Antitakeover Protection in IPO Firms, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83-120 ; Laura Casares 
Field & Jonathan M Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1857–1889, 185 
(2002). See also Michael Brennan & Julian Franks, Underpricing, Ownership and Control 
in Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the U.K., 45 J. FIN. ECON. 391-414 (1997) 
(claiming that managers opportunistically include anti-takeover provisions in the IPO 
charters to secure their private benefits of control after the company goes public). 
35 Some studies found that the use of anti-takeover provisions has no impact on the 
subsequent likelihood of acquisition or takeover premium, which are powerful ways to 
increase shareholder value. Rather, the findings show that those provisions that protect 
managers were adopted mainly to preserve their private benefit of control, which suggests 
agency problems in firms at the IPO stages. See Field & Karpoff, supra note 34, at 1884; 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713 
(2003). By contrast,  Daines & Klausner found that anti-takeover provision is used to protect 
management when takeovers are most likely, but did not find evidence that supports 
management's desire to protect high private benefits. See Daines & Klausner, Do IPO 
Charters Maximize Firm Value?, supra note 34. 
36 In other words, while an IPO decides how big the company’s size will be, a spin-off 
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incentive to attract investors by providing the optimal terms and governance 
structures, which makes spun-off companies more vulnerable to potential 
managerial entrenchment.37  
2. No Ex-Ante Shareholder Approval Requirement  
A spin-off has long been treated as a way of distributing a company’s 
assets to its shareholders. 38  Just as with other dividends, the managers’ 
decision to declare a spin-off is protected as a business decision that does not 
require shareholder approval. 39  Most state corporate laws as well as the 
Model Business Corporation Act provide that directors have full discretion 
to declare dividends without shareholder approval.40 Only managers decide 
whether, when, and how to pay dividends to shareholders and the 
shareholders do not have a right to demand dividends. But whether this 
managerial discretion extends to their freedom to decide all other details 
associated with SpinCo, particularly SpinCo’s corporate governance 
arrangements in its corporate charters, without shareholder approval remains 
unsettled. If this were the case, it would be a huge exception to most state 
corporate laws’ mandatory provisions requiring shareholder approval for 
charter amendments.41 
 Furthermore, given that both spin-offs and mergers are the same forms 
of corporate reorganizations going in opposite directions, the waiver of 
shareholder approval for spin-offs is more peculiar because mergers require 
                                                 
divides in smaller pieces without changing the sizes of the company. 
37 One might argue that because a spun-off company is a stand-alone public company 
and its shareholders’ subsequent sales of its stock can function as a monitoring mechanism. 
However, profit from the subsequent sales is irrelevant to the company’s assets and is not 
necessarily function as a monitoring mechanism for management.  
38 Distribution of SpinCo' stock to ParentCo shareholders is neither cash dividend nor 
stock dividend and a company’s charter provision on stock dividend does not apply. See In 
re IAC/InterActive Corp. 948 A. 2d 471, 511 (Del. Ch. 2008).  
39 For instance, Delaware General Corporation Act does not have a separate statutory 
provision regarding spin-offs, let alone shareholder approval requirement. See John Savva & 
Davis Wang, Spin-Offs: Frequently Asked Questions, DEAL LAWYERS (March-April 2016), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/krautheimer-savva-wang-deal-lawyers-spinoffs-
frequently-asked-questions-march-april-2016.pdf (“Under Delaware law, the generally 
accepted view is that a spin-off is not a “sale, lease or exchange” of property or assets of the 
parent that may implicate the requirement to obtain shareholder approval.”). 
40 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 141, 170; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 12.01(4) 
(explicitly providing that no shareholder approval is required “to distributes assets pro rata 
to the holders of one or more classes or series of a corporation’s shares.” However, managers’ 
discretion in declaring dividends is subject to any restrictions in each company’s corporate 
charters. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 12.01. 
41 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 242. 
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shareholder approval.42  
C. Spin-off and Tax-Free Benefits 
As we discussed in II.B above, a spin-off allows managers unparalleled 
discretion and immunity under corporate law. In this Part, we now turn to tax 
law to introduce the tax benefits that make a spin-off an even more attractive 
choice to management. 
1. Taxable Sale v. Tax-Free Spin-off 
If the rationale for a spin-off is that it is advantageous to separate the 
spun-off entity from the parent, a simpler way to achieve this result is for 
ParentCo to sell the spin-off’s assets or stocks. Given that selling is simple, 
why would management opt to pursue a spin-off strategy instead? The reason 
lies in the tax consequences of the transaction. Assuming that the stock or 
assets that would be separated from ParentCo appreciated in value while 
ParentCo held them, such a sale would realize the built-in gain on such stock 
or assets and thus ParentCo and its shareholders would be liable to pay taxes 
on such gain.43 On the other hand, the distribution of the spun-off entity’s 
stock to the parent’s shareholders as a spin-off division can be completed tax-
free for both ParentCo and its shareholders, 44  as long as the transaction 
satisfies the requirements set out in the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), 
which are explained in Subpart C.2. To be precise, the tax which would have 
been imposed on the spin-off transaction becomes deferred until a subsequent 
taxable event occurs—so the current spin-off is not subject to tax.45  
In our pizza example, if A, B, C, and D order a pepperoni pizza and A 
transfers his share – i.e., a quarter of pizza – to a third party, E, such transfer 
is a sale of pizza and treated as a taxable event. On the other hand, if A, B, C, 
                                                 
42 Commentators have criticized that shareholder voting requirement in mergers is not 
sufficient to prevent agency problem in governance changes during mergers due to “bundling” 
issue. That is, when shareholders vote on a merger agreement, adoption of anti-takeover 
provisions in a new company remains just a tiny part of the merger agreement. Even when 
shareholders do not want an anti-takeover charter provision, it is usually not a viable option 
for shareholders to reject a merger agreement solely for that reason. See Bebchuk and Kamar, 
Bundling and Entrenchment, supra note 19. This agency problem only worsens when there 
is no shareholder approval requirement—as in governance changes during spin-offs. 
43 See WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 4.  
44 Id. at 5. 
45  Candace A. Ridgway, Corporate Separations, 776-4TH TAX MGMT. BNA U.S. 
INCOME PORTF. (2017) [hereinafter BNA, Corporate Separations]. Alongside the sizable tax 
benefits weighing in favor of a spin-off, a sale may also require due diligence, negotiation, 
execution, higher risk, and regulatory approvals. A spin-off, however, is generally 
accomplished on an “as is,” “where is” basis. Id.  
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and D cut the whole pizza into four slices and have one slice each, or eight 
slices and have two slices each, that situation is analogous to a spin-off. The 
Code treats such slicing and distributing as tax-free. In other words, the Code 
allows tax-free benefits for certain spin-off transactions only if such spin-off 
is a mere change in corporate form – from a whole pizza into slices among 
stakeholders. It could vary how many pieces would the pizza be sliced into 
and how many slices would be allocated to A, B, C, and D. The Code’s 
requirements for tax-free spin-offs, therefore, are to guarantee that the slices 
are allocated proportionately among existing stakeholders.       
The tax-free status of the spin-off becomes crucial in many transactions 
aiming at separating corporate stock of assets. A notable example is Yahoo’s 
recent spin-off saga. Yahoo! Inc. first planned a tax-free spin-off of its stake 
in Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., a major Chinese e-commerce group.46 The 
Alibaba stock price had increased substantially since Yahoo! acquired 
Alibaba, such that Yahoo shareholders would have had to pay about $10 
billion in capital gains taxes should it have disposed of its shares outright. 
However, if the proposed deal had qualified for a tax-free spin-off, Yahoo! 
shareholders would have saved that substantial tax liability.47 The plan was 
criticized, however, as undeserving of the tax-free benefit. This was because 
Yahoo! planned not only to spin off its 284 million shares in Alibaba, worth 
$32 billion,48 by putting them into a newly registered company called Aabaco, 
but also planned to contribute its minor operating business to Aabaco so as 
to plausibly meet the requirements of a tax-free transaction. 49  The IRS 
declined to issue a private letter ruling on the proposed transaction, which 
suggested that the agency did not want to bless the deal by issuing a ruling.50 
Yahoo!’s tax adviser, Skadden Arps, issued a legal opinion reaffirming that 
the deal would be tax-free to the company and its shareholders.51 However, 
                                                 
46 Brian Womack, Yahoo to Spin Off Alibaba Stake Tax-Free as Public Company, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-
27/yahoo-unveils-tax-free-spinoff-of-its-holding-in-alibaba.  
47 Victor Fleischer, Yahoo’s Spinoff Plan Could Be Risky Business, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/business/dealbook/yahoos-spinoff-plan-
could-be-risky-business.html.  
48 Id. Other sources estimated the value of Alibaba shares at $40 billion or $23 billion. 
See Womack, supra note 46; Hannah Kuchler et al., Tax Rebuff Clouds Yahoo Spin-off Plan, 
FIN. TIMES (Sep. 8, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/907b671a-566c-11e5-a28b-
50226830d644, respectively.  
49 The requirement at issue was a valid (non-tax) business purpose. Victor Fleischer, 
Yahoo’s Tax-Free Spinoff Plan Parallels a Historic Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/business/dealbook/yahoos-tax-free-spinoff-plan-
parallels-a-historic-case.html. 
50 Fleischer, supra note 47.  
51 Id. 
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in response, the IRS issued Notice 2015-59, an administrative 
pronouncement expressing its concern about what it saw as possibly 
aggressive deals.52  
Although the language was general, everyone understood the IRS 
guidance was addressed to Yahoo!.53 Amid pressure from investors urging 
the board to abandon the spin-off of the Alibaba stock, the company dropped 
its former plan and instead introduced a new plan to spin off the company’s 
core business (i.e., web and advertising business), leaving the Alibaba stock 
and other assets as is in Yahoo!.54 However, the revised plan also had tax 
risks because the IRS would have likely evaluated the “reverse spin-off” in 
the same way it viewed the “forward spin-off” and denied it tax-free status.55 
And the result was as expected. Observing that the IRS had strengthened its 
position to curb aggressive tax-free spin-offs (as discussed with more details 
in Part III.C.), the company finally dropped the spin-off plans after 
concluding that both the forward and reverse spin-offs had the same tax risks. 
In the end, Yahoo decided to sell the core business to Verizon 
Communications, Inc, which, of course, is a taxable transaction.56    
2. Requirements for Tax-Free Benefits 
Tax law offers tax-free treatment when it comes to corporate 
reorganization, because it is inefficient to impose taxes on a transaction which 
is a mere change in existing corporate form or a shuffle of corporate assets. 
As shown in the pizza example, it holds true in corporate separation, such as 
spin-offs. The Code distinguishes mere changes in corporate structure via 
spin-off (distributing pizza slices) from cashing out a business sector (selling 
                                                 
52 I.R.S. Notice 2015-59, 2015-40 I.R.B. 459. 
53 Fleischer, supra note 47. 
54 Laura Davison, Yahoo Reconsiders Spinoff Plans as IRS Forms New Policies, DAILY 
TAX REP. (BNA) (Dec. 4, 2015); Brian Womack, Yahoo Scraps Alibaba Spinoff Amid 
Investor Pressure, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article48785550.html. Such  
“reverse spin-off” might have produced a modest amount of tax, but $10 billions of Yahoo’s 
potential tax liability on built-in gains on the Alibaba stock would not be taxed currently and 
could further be deferred indefinitely. Fleischer, supra note 47. 
55 Laura Davison, Yahoo's Reverse Spinoff Also Has Tax Risks; Will It Happen?, DAILY 
TAX REP. (BNA) (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.bna.com/yahoos-reverse-spinoff-
n57982065029/; Laura Davison, Yahoo Expects Reverse Spinoff Will Be Taxable, DAILY 
TAX REP. (BNA) (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.bna.com/yahoo-expects-reverse-
n57982066892/. 
56 Davison, supra note 54; Womack, supra note 54. Even after the core asset sale, Yahoo 
still has to go through reorganization of its holdings in Yahoo Japan and Alibaba. Laura 
Davison, Yahoo Still Has to Deal With Alibaba Assets After Core Sale, DAILY TAX REP. 
(BNA) (Jul. 27, 2016).  
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a slice), and treats the former as a non-taxable event for ParentCo and its 
shareholders and the latter as a taxable transaction. This Subpart briefly 
examines the relevant statutory requirements in Section 355 of the Code and 
the judicially created requirements.57 
a. Statutory Requirements 
There are four basic statutory requirements a spin-off must meet to 
qualify as a tax-free division under Section 355: 1) control, 2) distribution, 3) 
active trade or business, and 4) device limitation.58 
First, the parent may distribute only the stock of SpinCo that it “controls” 
immediately before the distribution by owning at least 80% of the stock by 
vote and number.59 Second, the parent generally must “distribute all” of the 
stock of SpinCo that it controls.60 Third, each of the surviving corporations 
(i.e., both ParentCo and SpinCo) should be engaged in the conduct of an 
active trade or business immediately after the division that was actively 
conducted for the five-year period prior to the spin-off.61 The purpose of this 
rule is to ensure the corporation is engaging in an active business rather than 
“merely hold[ing] a package of investment assets” in an attempt to “bail out 
corporate profits.”62 Finally, a spin-off must not be used principally as a 
“device” for the distribution of the earnings and profits of either ParentCo or 
SpinCo.63 This limitation is also to prevent a spin-off from being part of a 
                                                 
57 WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 45; BNA, Corporate Separations, supra 
note 45, at I.D.2. 
58 Id. at I.D.2.  
59 I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(A), (D), 368(c); see BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, 
at III.A, and II.B.1.  
60 However, if ParentCo does not distribute all of the stock in SpinCo, it must be able to 
explain to the IRS that its primary purpose for retaining the stock was not tax avoidance. 
I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D)(ii); BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at III.C. 
61  I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C), (b); MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 1130 (5th ed. 2014).  
62 BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at VI.B. The regulations further explain 
that an “active business” generally means the corporation itself performs the substantial 
management and operational activities through its own employees. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-
3(b)(2)(iii).  
63 See I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B). Determining what constitutes such a device is not clear, 
and the definition depends on all the facts and circumstances. The regulations list factors that 
indicate that a transaction is a “device” as well as factors that indicate a transaction is not a 
“device.” The factors that indicate a transaction is a device include: 1) pro rata distribution; 
2) subsequent sale or exchange of stock; and 3) the nature and use of assets. By contrast, the 
factors that indicate a transaction is not a “device” include: 1) corporate business purpose; 2) 
distributing corporation is publicly traded and widely held; and 3) distribution to domestic 
shareholders. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2), (3); BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, 
at V.A. 
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plan to bail out earnings and profits by selling stock or liquidating one of the 
corporations.64  
b. Judicial Requirements  
In addition to the statutory requirements, three judicially-developed 
requirements have emerged: 1) business purpose, 2) continuity of business 
enterprise, and 3) continuity of (proprietary) interest.65 They are subsequently 
included in the Treasury Regulations.66  
First, a spin-off must be carried out in whole, or substantial part, for one 
or more “business purposes,” and not solely for tax-avoidance reasons 67  
Examples of valid business purposes for a spin-off are pursuing fit and focus, 
cost savings, employee compensation, resolving shareholder conflicts, better 
capital raising condition, and so on.68 
Second, both the parent and the spun-off entity are required to “continue 
one of their businesses,” or to use a significant portion of their historic 
business assets in a business post spin-off.69 
Last but not least is the “continuity of proprietary (shareholder) interest” 
requirement. One or more shareholders of ParentCo are required to own an 
amount of stock establishing continuity of interest in each of the corporate 
forms in which the enterprise is conducting business following the spin-off.70 
The regulations do not specify a minimum required continuity. However, the 
examples in the regulations indicate that 20% continuity is too little and 50% 
continuity is adequate.71  
Those judicial requirements generally serve “substance over form” 
purposes to prevent a corporation from cashing out an active business through 
                                                 
64 See MCMAHON, supra note 61, at 1149. 
65 BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at II. 
66 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b), -1(b), -2(c), respectively.  
67 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1); BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at VIII. 
“Business purpose” is defined as a real and substantial non-tax purpose germane to the 
business of the parent, the spin-off, or an affiliated group. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2). There 
is a relationship between the business purpose requirement and the device limitation such 
that a strong business purpose for the spin-off may outweigh evidence that would otherwise 
indicate the spin-off was used as a device. BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at 
VIII.A. 
68 Id. at VIII.C.1.–5; see also WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 3. 
69 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(b). The continuity of business requirement has traditionally 
been understood as the same requirement for other reorganizations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-
1(d)(1); BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, at VII.B.. 
70 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1). It is included in the regulation to emphasize that the 
continuity of interest is an independent test that must be met under Section 355.  
71 See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(2) Ex. 1–4; BNA, Corporate Separations, supra note 45, 
at VII.A.1.  
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a spin-off transaction that has the same economic consequences as just selling 
a business which would have been a taxable sale transaction.72 To merit the 
tax-free benefit, the substance of the transaction must consist of the mere 
rearrangement of corporate assets in one or more continuing corporate 
enterprises owned by the original owners.  
However, what if the rights and role of the original owners, or those of 
the parent’s shareholders, have changed significantly post spin-off? 
Figuratively speaking, what if the pepperoni topping is allocated in a 
significantly disproportionate fashion while slicing? The question might be 
raised in the context of the continuity of interest requirement. The existing 
rules only concern whether original shareholders receive an instrument 
labeled “equity” and whether these original shareholders receive more than 
the minimum percentage – i.e., about 50% – set out in the regulations.73 The 
rules do not consider the qualitative difference in stock due to governance 
changes in the enterprises, such as voting rights changes occurred during the 
spin-off.  
In our pizza example, pizza slice is considered as equity and pepperoni 
topping is considered as shareholder rights attached to the equity, such as 
voting right. Current law only makes sure that the slices are the same size and 
allocated fairly to the existing stakeholders—that is, original shareholders 
should receive at least 50% of the slices to meet the continuity of interest 
requirement. Current law, however, does not concern whether the pepperoni 
topping is continued in original shareholders at a substantially similar level 
after slice distribution. As long as original stakeholders receive the 
substantially proportional number of the same-sized slices, it does not 
consider the disproportionate distribution of topping among stakeholders 
who receive the slices. However, is the pizza slice distribution that is 
proportional in slice quantity but disproportional in topping quality a mere 
change in form? Analogously, is a spin-off that distributes stock that is 
qualitatively different from ParentCo stock due to the governance disparity 
to original shareholders a mere change in form? Does such spin-off qualify 
tax-free benefit? The answer under current law is positive. The authors, 
however, argue that the rule should be revisited to reconsider the current 
treatment. This problem will be revisited in Parts II.A.2 and II.C.2. after 
exploring the governance disparity relating to spin-offs below. 
                                                 
72 Id. at II.E.1. The judicial requirements overlap considerably with the device limitation, 
which patrols against prearranged post-distribution sales as part of its anti-bailout mission.” 
STEPHEN SCHWARZ ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES TAXATION 921 (6th 
ed. 2017). 
73 Id.; Joshua D. Blank, Confronting Continuity: A Tradition of Fiction in Corporate 
Reorganizations, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
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D.  Spin-offs as Joint Products of Corporate and Tax Laws 
 This Part examined how corporate spin-offs are entitled to special 
treatment under both corporate law (i.e., no checking mechanisms) and tax 
law (i.e., tax-free benefits). Spin-offs generally are initiated by strong 
business goals, but the completion of spin-offs is often conditioned on 
obtaining tax-free treatment of those spin-offs. As such, corporate law and 
tax law considerations function as key elements among others for spin-off 
transactions. In that light, neither corporate law nor tax law alone would be 
sufficient to fully address problems arising from spin-offs and the first 
cooperative analysis of corporate and tax law in this Article would provide a 
holistic view to the problems we identify in the next chapter.  
II.  MANAGEMENT INSULATION BY CORPORATE SEPARATION 
As we have discussed in the previous Part, a corporate spin-off provides 
a unique opportunity for managers to transform corporate governance 
structures without shareholder approval or market checks. The fact that 
ParentCo’s managers have full discretion in setting SpinCo’s governance 
arrangement in its corporate charter brings us to the question of whether, and 
if so to what extent, managers actually exercise the discretion. Having a right 
is one thing, but exercising the right is another. When managers have 
discretion free from shareholder approval, how do they use the discretion? 
In practice, managers tend to proactively utilize the opportunity to adopt 
governance choices that may limit shareholder power. Adoption of anti-
takeover charter provisions in SpinCo has been the most common form of 
governance changes. Recently, along with the new phenomenon of dual-class 
stock structure, the frequency of dual-class stock structure in SpinCo also has 
increased. The potential risk of the unilateral reallocation of power is 
significantly intensified when a spin-off is combined with a dual-class stock 
structure in the sense that any change in voting rights is often times 
irreversible, and thus perpetuates the unilateral allocation of control. In this 
Part, we uncover how the combination of dual-class stock and spin-offs raises 
not only a perceived risk but a real one by discussing a real-world example.    
A. Spin-offs and Managers’ Unilateral Governance Changes   
As we discussed above, most state corporate laws treat a spin-off as a 
dividend to shareholders, which is within managers’ discretion.74 Thus, the 
                                                 
74 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 170. (“Courts have consistently refused to 
second-guess management’s decision on dividends holding that those decisions should be 
deferred to business judgment protection. See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 3e83 N.Y.S. 
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rationale for granting unfettered discretion to managers in making spin-offs 
stems from the managerial discretion for dividends, which emphasizes 
operational efficiency. Corporate law has consistently viewed managers’ 
decision on dividends as a business decision on the basis that dividends do 
not change shareholder rights fundamentally.75  
 In the recent practice of spin-offs, however, managers have been using 
their discretionary power not only for a dividend decision but also to change 
governance structure. For instance, during a spin-off, the managers of a 
ParentCo can adopt provisions in a SpinCo’s corporate charter that 
shareholders would likely reject if it were up for ParentCo shareholders’ vote 
because those governance changes tend to give more power or protection to 
management.76  
1. Corporate Law Considerations of Unilateral Governance Changes  
 In 2012, ConocoPhillips spun off from its downstream businesses under 
a new independent company named Phillips 66. At that time, the spun-off 
company was worth about $34.5 billion, consisting of roughly 28%, in terms 
of the market capitalization, of the parent company.77 As one of the largest 
public companies itself, Phillips 66 was not necessarily vulnerable to a hostile 
takeover attempt, but its corporate charter implemented a staggered board 
provision on top of other provisions modeled after the parent company’s 
charter provisions.78  
 The adoption of a staggered board, however, went in the opposite 
                                                 
2d 807, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1976).   
75 Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
847 (2005) (“Corporate law does not view decisions about distributions, however 
economically important, as involving the kind of fundamental change that calls for 
shareholder veto power. Rather, such decisions are viewed as part of the ordinary conduct of 
business delegated to the sole prerogative of management.”).  
76  Empirical data shows the frequent use of antitakeover provisions in spun-off 
companies. See supra note 4. This practice remains consistent with guidance provided in 
client letters generated by law firms. See, e.g., Francis J. Aquila, Key Issues When 
Considering a Spin-off (Jun. 2015), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/June15_InTheBoardroom.pdf (“Putting takeover 
defenses (such as establishing a classified board…) in the subsidiary’s charter or by-laws 
puts the subsidiary’s board in a better negotiating position against a potential acquirer, 
allowing directors to protect the interests of the shareholders by fending off unfair or 
undesirable bids.”).  
77  Christopher Helman, As ConocoPhillips Spins Off Refining Assets, Think Twice 
Before Buying the New Phillips 66, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/04/30/as-conocophillips-spins-off-
refining-assets-should-you-own-the-new-phillips-66/. 
78 AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF PHILLIPS 66, Article 
Fifth.  
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direction of the recent movement of eliminating such structure from corporate 
charters on shareholders’ request. A staggered board has long been regarded 
as one of the most effective anti-takeover provisions that insulates 
management from shareholder intervention. 79  Similar to U.S. senators’ 
staggered elections, when a company staggers its board, only one third of 
directors are elected each year and the directors cannot be removed without 
cause.80 This tactic can delay a hostile insurgent’s attempt to replace the 
directors up to three years at its maximum. 81  The management of 
ConocoPhillips did not even need to persuade shareholders to adopt this 
controversial staggered board structure because it emerged through the spin-
off process without shareholder approval. 
 As such, the current practice of managers’ unilateral governance changes 
in the course of spin-offs is inconsistent with corporate law’s implicit 
assumption for spin-offs: no fundamental changes to the company before and 
after the spin-off. Adopting an anti-takeover charter provision is a common 
way for ParentCo’s managers to change governance arrangements. If 
ParenCo’s managers add a new provision affecting the allocation of power 
between shareholders and managers into a SpinCo’s charter, the change is 
not a mere distribution anymore. Accordingly, the assumption for a spin-off 
that there are no fundamental changes before and after the spin-off is broken 
when the spin-off introduces governance change.  
 Empirical data supports the prevalence of anti-takeover provisions in 
SpinCo.82 On why SpinCo tends to have more anti-takeover provisions than 
ParentCo, two competing hypotheses have existed.83 First, the “entrenchment 
hypothesis” argues that ParentCo’s managers adopt antitakeover provisions 
in SpinCo when those provisions would extract more of their private benefit 
out of the entrenchment.84 Alternatively, the “efficiency hypothesis” claims 
                                                 
79 For the discussion of antitakeover effect of staggered board structure, see, e.g., Lucian 
Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, 
and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002). Recent study finds that a staggered board’s effect 
on firm value vary depending on each company’s unique characteristics. Yakov Amihud, 
Markus Schmid, and Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling the Staggered Board Debate, 166 
U. PA. L. REV. 1475 (2018) (“The effect of a staggered board is idiosyncratic; for some firms 
it increases value, while for other firms it is value-destroying.”).  
80 For a default structure of staggered boards, see, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 141(b). 
81 If a company’s charter or bylaws gives shareholders the right to call a “special meeting” 
or to act by “written consent” between annual meetings, hostile insurgent can replace the 
entire members on the staggered board in less than three years.  
82 See Daines & Klausner, Agents Protecting Agents, supra note 4, at 22-23.   
83 For the detailed development and empirical tests of the two hypotheses, see Daines & 
Klausner, Agents Protecting Agents, supra note 4, at 13-15.  
84 Daines & Klaunser’s empirical finding supports the “Entrenchment Hypothesis.” 
(“[T]hese results are consistent with the proposition that the takeover defenses are adopted 
out of entrenching, rather than share value-maximization, motivations.”) Daines & Klaunser, 
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that ParentCo’s managers adopt new antitakeover protections in SpinCo to 
enhance shareholder value. For instance, when SpinCo is much smaller than 
the previously combined company and thus more vulnerable to hostile 
takeover attempts, antitakeover provisions may protect from those attempts 
or at least increase SpinCo’s bargaining power for the better price.85  
 The purpose of this Article is not to claim that an additional anti-takeover 
provision in SpinCo itself is necessarily entrenching or efficient. This is 
because both the incentives of managers and the effects of an anti-takeover 
provision may vary depending on each company’s unique situation. Instead, 
this Article focuses on the procedural loophole where governance changes 
are made during spin-offs. The current regime grants managers unfettered 
freedom for governance changes in the course of spin-offs, and managers 
have been actively exercising discretion in choosing more anti-takeover 
provisions.  
 The concern about managers’ unilateral governance changes in spin-offs 
is still valid but with different weights under entrenchment and efficiency 
hypotheses on the prevalence of on why SpinCo has more antitakeover 
provisions than its ParentCo. First, if ParentCo’s managers adopt 
antitakeover provisions in furtherance of their entrenchment (as under the 
“entrenchment hypothesis”), it is palpable that the lack of a monitoring 
mechanism for governance changes over spin-offs would facilitate the 
managers’ opportunistic governance changes and thus increases agency costs 
out of the entrenchment. For instance, entrenching managers would have 
ample incentives to take advantage of this procedural loophole to adopt a 
charter provision that protects them from shareholder intervention even 
further.  
 Second, even when managers implement anti-takeover provisions in 
SpinCo to advance shareholder value (as argued in the “efficiency 
hypothesis”), this legitimate incentive does not necessarily justify the 
elimination of a checking mechanism for introducing the anti-takeover 
provisions in SpinCo charter. This is largely because of the rigidity of 
corporate charters. State corporate laws require mutual consent between 
managers and shareholders to amend corporate charters and neither 
shareholders nor managers cannot change corporate charters unilaterally.86 
Thus, once ParentCo managers implement an anti-takeover provision in 
SpinCo’s charter, shareholders cannot take it off without managers’ consent.  
                                                 
Agents Protecting Agents, supra note 4, at 21.  
85 See WACHTELL SPIN-OFF GUIDE, supra note 1, at 22-23. This rationale, however, is 
not compelling for the recent trend of spin-offs dividing a ParentCo into two companies of 
comparable sizes as occurred with Motorola, Hewlett Packard, Tyco, and DowDuPont. See 
id.  
86 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2014). 
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 Because the efficiency of anti-takeover provisions is volatile as the 
company’s other features evolve (e.g., ownership structure, company age, or 
company size), an efficient anti-takeover provision at the time of the adoption 
is not necessarily efficient ten years after the adoption. Also, because all anti-
takeover provisions inherently have a self-serving element to managers by 
securing their tenure on the board, the adoption of an “efficient-for-now” 
anti-takeover provision is always vulnerable to managerial entrenchment. 
Thus, a shareholder approval requirement may still function as a useful 
checking process even for adoption of efficient charter provisions to 
maximize shareholder value.  
 Furthermore, in other contexts of corporate law including mergers, 
shareholder approval is necessary for managers to change corporate charter 
provisions regardless the efficiency of the provision at the time of the 
adoption. When it comes to fundamental changes such as governance 
changes through corporate charters, shareholders are given a chance to voice 
themselves on the issue. In that sense, the current procedural loophole in spin-
offs, which enables managers’ unilateral changes, make the use of efficient 
anti-takeover provision less desirable because it inadvertently intensifies the 
risk of managerial entrenchment.    
2. Tax Considerations of Unilateral Governance Changes 
Setting aside the corporate law consequences, let us consider the tax 
consequences from a policy perspective. Allowing tax-free benefits to spin-
offs encompassing significant governance changes is not a good tax policy. 
It is inefficient and unfair for the following reasons.  
First, current tax law treatment of spin-offs is inefficient because it may 
encourage certain spin-off transactions that are not mere changes in form. 
The rationale for the tax-free benefits for reorganization transactions is to 
support such reorganization that would transform the business structure into 
more efficient one. As long as such a transformation is a mere change in form 
that is economically equivalent before and after the fact, it is worth 
facilitating it by deferring tax liability on the built-in gain in the business. 
Thus, it is critical that the reorganization represents merely a change in form 
and does not entail any change in substance.  
However, contemporary spin-offs are not simply used to reorganize 
corporate structures. There are many examples showing that a spin-off is a 
convenient way not only to slice off a profitable sector from ParentCo but 
also to create the corporate structure of SpinCo completely different from 
ParentCo without shareholders’ consent. And the resulting new corporate 
governance structure benefits managers, not shareholders.  
Tax law, then, should not encourage such analogous spin-offs at least. 
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Nonetheless, current tax law ignores the potential risk of governance change 
in spin-offs and offers tax benefits as long as the transaction technically 
satisfies the outdated requirements that only consider the quantity of the 
continued equity. This encourages such deviant spin-offs that would not be 
executed had it incurred a risk of triggering tax liability on the built-in gains. 
Such behavioral distortion has nothing to do with correcting market failure 
on corporate reorganizations. Rather, it promotes the market manipulation on 
corporate reorganizations by managers by lifting a regulatory hurdle, called 
tax.  
Second, current tax law treatment of spin-offs is unfair because it treats 
two different types of spin-offs the same and allow tax free benefits to both. 
Without the special tax provisions for reorganizations, the reorganization 
transaction should be considered as a taxable event. However, tax law 
specially offers tax-free benefits to certain type of reorganizations that are 
mere changes in form. Thus, given the rationale of tax-free benefits for 
reorganization, tax treatment should be different between the reorganization 
transactions that are mere changes in form and that of reorganization 
transactions that are changes in substance. Tax free benefits should only be 
allowed to the former and not to the latter.  
Nonetheless, current law does not distinguish the two and rather treats 
them the same. It ignores the potential risk of governance changes in spin-
offs and offers tax benefits to those spin-offs that might be changes in 
substance. It is the violation of horizontal equity that demands the equal 
treatment for taxpayers in equal situations and the different treatment for 
taxpayers in different situations.  
Another criterion to consider in tax policy analysis is administrability. 
Current law might be simpler than the proposed approach that distinguishes 
spin-offs that are mere changes in form from those that are not.87 A long and 
detailed statute may result in compliance complexity, but if it gives a very 
specific solution to a problem, that feature can reduce rule complexity and 
can make things simpler overall. It also may contribute to more efficient and 
equitable result.   
B. Spin-offs and Dual-Class Stock  
The agency problems arising out of the managers’ unilateral governance 
                                                 
87 The third prong for tax policy analysis is complexity. David Bradford categorizes 
complexity into three different categories – i) compliance complexity (the cost taxpayers has 
to pay to comply the rule), ii) rule complexity (the difficulty to understand what the law is), 
and iii) transactional complexity (complexity that arises from taxpayers organizing their 
affairs to minimize taxes). DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266-67 
(1986). 
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changes described above can significantly be compounded when ParentCo’s 
managers adopt a dual-class stock structure in SpinCo without shareholder 
approval. Dual-class stock structure, which allocates varying voting rights 
(e.g., high-vote and low-vote) to different classes of common stockholders, 
is an extremely effective form of governance choice that separates ownership 
from control. Academic literature evaluating spin-offs and dual-class stock 
respectively have developed, and no prior studies have analyzed an 
interaction between spin-offs and dual-class stock. The scarcity of studies 
may be largely because both have not been prevalent until recent years.88 
Given that both spin-offs and dual-class stock have been surging recently, 
however, it is crucial to understand how the interaction between spin-offs and 
dual-class stock can affect the corporate governance landscape. 
1. Dual-Class Stock as a Separator of Ownership and Control among 
Shareholders  
Among various charter and bylaw provisions that may affect shareholder 
rights, a dual-class stock structure is one of the most effective mechanisms 
for keeping control within a small number of insiders. Dual-class stock 
enables high-vote stockholders to dominate all shareholder voting agendas, 
from annual director elections to M&A approvals. Typically, dual-class stock 
limits the transfer of high-vote stock by means of neutralizing higher voting 
rights when the stock is transferred to non-initial holders. In that way, the 
high-vote stock can remain only in hands of the initial holders.  
Dual-class capital structures are sometimes used not because of concerns 
about short-term market pressure and takeover threats but to achieve tax or 
other transaction planning objectives. For example, when a parent company 
decides to spin off a subsidiary, it often also decides to raise capital before 
the spin-off by causing the subsidiary to engage in an IPO. If the parent 
company maintains at least 80% of the voting power in the subsidiary 
following the IPO, the subsequent spin-off receives tax-free treatment. 
Raising large amounts of capital, however, may require the parent company 
to sell more than 20% of the subsidiary’s common stock. The dual-class 
structure offers a solution. The parent company can create a dual-class 
structure in the subsidiary, then sell low-vote stock to the public in the IPO, 
and retain the high-vote stock. This practice allows the parent company to 
sell as much stock as necessary to raise capital while still maintaining 80% 
of the voting power in the subsidiary to realize tax benefits. In the Zoetis IPO 
in January 2018, Pfizer used the dual-class structure to raise $2.2 billion in 
                                                 
88 Dains & Klusner, Agents Protecting Agents, supra note 4, at 12 (“Dual-class stock is 
more entrenching but not common.”). 
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the IPO while maintaining 98% of the voting power in Zoetis and preserving 
the flexibility to conduct a tax-free spin-off at a later stage.89 
Dual-class stock structure has become one of the most heavily debated 
issues in corporate governance, and the debate is still far from over.90 While 
dual-class stock itself has been subject to regulation on and off for several 
decades,91 the recent debate over its desirability was sparked when Google 
(now Alphabet) adopted unequal voting rights at its IPO in 2004. 92  The 
debate was inflamed when Snap, Inc.’s founders offered only non-voting 
stock to the public in its IPO in 2017. 93  The dual-class stock has been 
commonly used for founders, as holders of higher votes per share, to retain 
control over the company without corresponding economic risk.94  
Proponents of dual-class stock offer arguments rooted in the traditional 
corporate law approach to governance that values each company’s flexibility 
to choose the rules that best suits its needs, including dual-class stock 
structure. 95  For certain companies—young tech firms, for instance—
                                                 
89 Stephen I. Glover & Aarthy S. Thamodaran, Debating Pros and Cons of Dual-class 
Capital Structures, 27 Insights Volume (Mar. 2013) 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/GloverThamodaran-
DualClassCapitalStructures.pdf. 
90 For a comprehensive review of the debate, see generally Dorothy Lund, Nonvoting 
Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, STAN. L. R.(forthcoming) (2019).  
91  Dual-class stock dates back to 1920s. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in 
Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 687, 693–97 (1985); Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to 
SEC Rule 19c-4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 982 (1989); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L. 
REV. 585, 596 (2017).  
92 The ratio of voting rights per share for each class of Google common stock is Class A 
(1): Class B (10): Class C (0).   
93 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-
evan-spiegel.html.  
94 See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 
125 YALE L. J. 560, 563 (2016). 
95 See David J. Berger, Dual-Class Stock and Private Ordering: A System That Works, 
HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(May 24, 2007), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/24/dual-class-stock-and-private-
ordering-a-system-that-works/#more-90363 (“[W]e believe that the present system of 
private ordering with respect to dual-class stock will—and should—continue. Private 
ordering allows boards, investors, and other corporate stakeholders to determine the most 
appropriate capital structure for a particular company, given its specific needs.”); The 
Promise of Market Reform: Reigniting America’s Economic Engine, NASDAQ (2017), 
https://business.nasdaq.com/media/Nasdaq_Blueprint_to_Revitalize_Capital_Markets_Apr
il_2018_tcm5044-43175.pdf (“Each publicly-traded company should have flexibility to 
determine a class structure that is most appropriate and beneficial for them, so long as this 
structure is transparent and disclosed up-front so that investors have complete visibility into 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346805 
30 Insulation by Separation [27-Feb-19 
 
 
founders benefit from the insulation that dual-class stock provides from short-
term market pressure because it enables the founders to pursue their long-
term vision, which may increase shareholder value in the long run. 96 
Opponents of dual-class stock, on the other hand, raise concerns about how 
the structure could exacerbate agency costs based on the traditional 
perspective regarding the private benefit of control.97 They argue that, since 
controllers’ economic benefit may be less aligned with stock value, they 
would find it more beneficial to extract private benefit using their control 
rather than to improve firm value. Early empirical studies suggested that 
companies with dual-class stock are more likely to reduce shareholder 
value.98 As a more practical solution, some opponents propose limiting the 
duration of the voting power differential under a dual-class system.99 They 
argue that sunset provisions, which fix a dual-class stock’s expiration date, 
should be included to balance costs and benefits of dual-class stock because 
potential benefits of dual-class stock decrease as time passes and thus are 
likely to be outweighed by potential costs.100  
Both proponents and opponents of the debate, however, pay little 
attention to the further possibility that managers can unilaterally rearrange 
                                                 
the company.”). 
96 See generally Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder 
Value, 8 HARV. BUS. LAW REV. 53 (2018); Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private Ordering 
Defense of a Company's Right to Use Dual-class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV. 
(2018) (“Once we start thinking in terms of minimizing total control costs, it becomes easier 
to accept that allowing for the private benefits of control associated with dual-class share 
structures may actually be a contributing factor to the long-term value of the firm.”). 
97 On July 21, 2016, thirteen high profile executives and investment managers declared 
that a “[d]ual class voting is not a best practice.” COMMONSENSE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 5 (2016).  
98 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 91, at 603 (“Paul Gompers … studying U.S. dual-
class companies over 1995-2002, found evidence that these companies exhibited increased 
agency costs and reduced value.”); Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An 
Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1051-54 (2010); 
Ronald W. Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1722 
(2009) (“Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that insiders holding more voting 
rights relative to cash flow rights extract more private benefits at the expense of outside 
shareholders.”); Blair Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann 
LLP, Dual-Class: The Consequences of Depriving Institutional Investors of Corporate 
Voting Rights, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND F. REG. (May 17, 2007), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/24/dual-class-stock-and-private-ordering-a-
system-that-works/#more-90363 (“[s]uch structures reduce oversight by, and accountability 
to, the actual majority owners of the company. They hamper the ability of boards of directors 
to execute their fiduciary duties to shareholders. And they can incentivize managers to act in 
their own interests, instead of acting in the interest of the company’s owners.”). 
99 See generally Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 91. 
100 Id. 
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the initial allocation of voting rights through spin-offs. The costs from this 
possibility should be considered in evaluating the advantages and 
disadvantages of dual-class stock. This Article contributes to the current 
debate on the desirability of dual-class stock by providing a necessary but 
little-known perspective to evaluate dual-class stock.  
2. Spin-off as a Waiver to Current Restrictions on Dual-Class Stock 
 Due to dual-class stock structure’s power to perpetuate the disparity of 
ownership and control, adoption of dual-class stock without shareholder 
approval significantly intensifies potential agency costs discussed in the 
earlier section of this paper.101 Adoption of dual-class stock also circumvents 
major stock exchange rules prohibiting a midstream conversion from single-
class to dual-class stock structure. Since the current major stock exchange 
rules prohibit dual-class recapitalization (i.e., switching to dual-class stock 
midstream), listed companies can adopt dual-class stock only when they issue 
their stock to the public for the first time via initial public offering (“IPO”).102 
During the IPO process, the perception of the value of the dual-class stock 
will be reflected in the price of the securities issued. Once the company has 
gone public, market participants will be able to make their own decision 
about whether they find the dual-class stock acceptable. In spin-offs, by 
contrast, shareholders have no opportunity to veto managers’ adoption of 
dual-class stock to a spin-off company even when it may significantly dilute 
their voting rights.  
C. Aggravating Effects of Spin-off and Dual-Class Stock  
So far, we have analyzed how the new practice of dual-class stock 
structure in a spun-off company may increase agency costs at a theoretical 
level. This Subpart presents a real-world example that demonstrates how 
shareholder voting rights can be distorted by dual-class stock adopted in a 
SpinCo. While anti-takeover provisions in a SpinCo charter are much more 
troubling when managers add a new provision that does not exist in a 
ParentCo charter without shareholder approval, the existence of dual-class 
stock structure in SpinCo itself has a power to significantly change the 
allocation of power within the company, notwithstanding the extremity of the 
case where managers newly adopt dual-class stock structure in SpinCo 
without shareholder consent.103  
                                                 
101 See supra Part II.A.  
102 See NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 313.00 (1992); NASDAQ Stock Market 
Rule 5640. 
103 On the context of anti-takeover provisions, Daines & Klausner call this type of 
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1. Corporate Law: Reallocation of Voting Rights  
In 2017, NACCO Industries (“ParentCo”) spun off its home appliances 
and commercial restaurant equipment business under the name of Hamilton 
Beach Brand Holding Company (HBB, “SpinCo”). In the process of 
separation, the SpinCo took a significant majority of the ParentCo’s revenue. 
ParentCo’s CEO resigned his role as CEO of ParentCo and became the 
executive chairman of SpinCo.104 This was another case where the SpinCo 
took the lion’s share.  
The SpinCo’s charter was largely modeled after the ParentCo’s charter, 
including a dual-class stock structure. Because the ParentCo already was 
structured as dual-class stock, some may argue that the SpinCo’s dual-class 
stock was not a surprise to the ParentCo shareholders, and thus the risk of 
voting right distortion before and after the spin-off was low. The 
NACCO/HBB spin-off, however, presents a vivid example showing how the 
existence of dual-class stock in the SpinCo itself can facilitate manager-
driven governance changes while retaining the voting rights gap between 
high-votes and low-votes stockholders—all without shareholder approval. 
a. Allocation of Voting Rights in ParentCo Before the Spin-off  
NACCO Industries, the ParentCo, has had a dual-class structure since its 
incorporation in 1987.  The arrangement gives one vote per share for Class A 
Common stockholders and ten votes per share for Class B Common 
stockholders.105 As of 2017, NACCO’s dual-class stock structure enabled the 
high-vote Class B stockholders to exercise 75% of voting rights despite their 
ownership of only 23% of the company stock. By contrast, while the low-
vote Class A stockholders hold 77% of economic interests, their collective 
voting rights were only 23%, which was far below the 50% threshold. Table 
2 below shows this disparity between stock ownership and voting rights prior 
to the spin-off using simplified numbers/ratio of actual ones. The disparity 
                                                 
charter amendment as a “back door charter amendment.” See Daines & Klausner, Agents 
Protecting Agents, supra note 4, at 22. (claiming that ParentCo managers inclusion of anti-
takeover provision in their SpinCo charter when the ParentCo’s own charters do not have 
those anti-takeover provisions would in effect, amend the SpinCo charter without 
shareholder consent and finding that “such back-door amendments commonly occur.”).  
104 Hamilton Beach Brand Holding Company, Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 4 
(Aug. 21, 2017). See also George Joshman, Everything But the Kitchen Sink-NACCO to Spin 
Off Hamilton Beach Kitchen Appliance Division, Stock Spinoffs (Aug. 23, 2017) 
https://www.stockspinoffs.com/2017/08/23/everything-kitchen-sink-nacco-spin-off-
hamilton-beach-kitchen-appliance-division/.  
105 RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF NACCO INDUSTRIES, INC., Article 
Fourth. 3 (a) (Mar. 31, 1993). 
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between ownership and voting rights may not be bad per se, but it makes the 
company more susceptible to the agency problem with the high-vote holders, 
mostly corporate insiders including founding family members.106    
 











Votes in  
NACCO  
% of Voting 
Right in 
NACCO  












Total 325 100% 1,000 100% 
  
Moreover, the ParentCo had a charter provision on the equal distribution 
requirement in dividends preventing the reallocation of voting rights that may 
arise from stock dividends.108 The ParentCo’s charter provision on dividends 
stipulates that its low-vote Class A and high-vote Class B common stock have 
equal rights to stock dividends as long as each class receives the same class 
of stock as a dividend when it comes to the distribution of the company’s 
stock. 109  When the company distributes cash, stock, or property of the 
                                                 
106 See supra Part I.B.1.  
107 The numbers in the Tables 2-4 are simplified forms of the actual numbers/ratio 
disclosed in the SEC filings. See NACCO Industries, Proxy Material for the 2017 shareholder 
meeting. (“Stockholders of record at the close of business on March 20, 2017 will be entitled 
to notice of, and to vote at, the Annual Meeting. On that date, we had 5,260,048 outstanding 
shares of Class A Common Stock, par value $1.00 per share ("Class A Common"), entitled 
to vote at the Annual Meeting and 1,570,815 outstanding shares of Class B Common Stock, 
par value $1.00 per share ("Class B Common"), entitled to vote at the Annual Meeting.”). 
108 RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF NACCO INDUSTRIES, INC., Article 
Fourth. 6. (Mar. 31, 1993). 
109 Id. The full text of the charter provision is as follows:  
[E]ach share of Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock shall be equal 
in respect of rights to dividends and other distributions in cash, stock or property of 
the Corporation, provided that in the case of dividends or other distributions payable 
in stock of the Corporation, including distributions pursuant to stock split-ups or 
divisions of stock of the Corporation, which occur after the date shares of Class B 
Common Stock are first issued by the Corporation, only shares of Class A Common 
Stock shall be distributed with respect to Class A Common Stock and only shares 
of Class B Common Stock shall be distributed with respect to Class B Common 
Stock. 
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company, the company has to make an equal distribution to both Class A and 
Class B common stock in proportion to the amount of stock owned. If the 
company declares a dividend for only one class of stock or makes different 
types or amounts of dividends, it would violate the charter provision.110 The 
only exception applies when the company distributes the company’s own 
stock. In other words, the charter requires that Class A and Class B 
stockholders should receive the identical class of stock as dividends 
respectively: Class A stockholders receive Class A stock only, and Class B 
stockholders receive Class B stock only as dividends.  
However, the charter provision has been silent on the distribution of its 
subsidiary’s stock, which is a common mechanism of a spin-off. In spin-offs, 
what ParentCo distributes is not the company’s own stock but its subsidiary 
company (i.e., SpinCo)’s stock, which is a part of ParentCo’s assets.111 Due 
to this silence, when ParentCo spin-offs a subsidiary, its Class A and Class B 
stock classes are both entitled to receive the equal distribution of subsidiary 
stock. Specifically in the NACCO/HBB spin-off, the ParentCo’s low-vote 
Class A stockholders and high-vote Class B stockholders have equal rights 
to the distribution of the SpinCo’s stock and thus the ParentCo was required 
to distribute one share of the SpinCo Class A common stock and one share 
of SpinCo Class B common stock to each stock of the ParentCo as dividends 
in proportion to the total number of ParentCo stock they own.112  
Due to this equal distribution provision, NACCO’s subsequent spin-offs 
would incrementally dilute the high-vote Class B stockholders’ voting rights. 
The corporate insiders who were managers and held most of the high-vote 
Class B stock in NACCO were in need of preventing a further dilution of 
voting rights during spin-offs. Instead of going through a charter amendment 
process that requires shareholder approval, the managers of NACCO took 
advantage of occasion of the spin-off to amend the charter provision without 
shareholder consent.113  
                                                 
110 Alternatively, other companies may provide an option for shareholders to receive 
dividends either in cash or in stock. But this option has not been prevalent because it rejects 
tax-free benefit for the distribution under the tax code. See I.R.C. § 305(b)(1).   
111 The court distinguishes a distribution of a company’s own stock and a distribution of 
a subsidiary’s stock. See, e.g., In re IAC/InterActive Corp (Del. Ch. 2008).  
112 See Hamilton Beach Brand Holding Company, Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 
37. (Aug. 21, 2017). 
113 In a company with a dual-class structure, managers tend to be under the influence of 
high-vote class stockholders such as founders of the company. Thus, while technically 
ParentCo’s managers are the ones who set SpinCo’s governance arrangement, the direction 
of change aligns with the interest of high-vote class stockholders in most cases.  
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b.  Nominal Change in Voting Rights Allocation After Spin-off 
What managers claimed, however, in the new SpinCo’s registration 
statement does not seem to benefit ParentCo’s high-vote stockholders and 
managers. On the contrary, managers claimed that the equal distribution 
requirement in ParentCo charter would reverse the proportional interest that 
ParentCo’s shareholders will have in SpinCo, and thus ParentCo’s high-vote 
stockholders will hold minority voting powers in SpinCo, while ParentCo’s 
low-vote stockholders will hold majority voting powers in SpinCo.  
Table 3 below, using simplified numbers/ratio of the actual ones/ratio of 
the actual ones, explains the argument by the managers. ParentCo’s low-vote 
Class A stockholders previously had 250 shares in ParentCo, representing 25% 
voting rights in ParentCo as shown in Table 2 above. Due to the equal stock 
distribution requirement for spin-offs, ParentCo Class A stockholders receive 
250 Class A shares and 250 Class B shares in SpinCo. Because SpinCo also 
has a dual-class stock structure, SpinCo’s low-vote Class A stock gets one 
vote per share, and SpinCo’s high-vote Class B stock gets ten votes per share. 
Consequently, ParentCo’s low-vote Class A stockholders’ total voting rights 
in SpinCo would be 2750 (=250x1+250x10), representing 77% of the votes 
in SpinCo. In the same way, ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stockholders’ 
voting rights in SpinCo is 825 (=75x1+72x10), representing 23% of the votes 
in SpinCo.  
In sum, the low-vote Class A stockholders in ParentCo, representing only 
25% voting rights in ParentCo, will control 77% of the votes in SpinCo 
(=2750/(2750+825)), whereas high-vote Class B stockholders in ParentCo, 
representing 75% voting rights in ParentCo, will control only 23% of voting 
right in SpinCo.     
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Total 325 100% 650 3575 100% 
 
                                                 
114 Id.  
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c. High-to-Low Conversion and Actual Changes in Voting Right Allocation  
At first glance, as ParentCo managers argued, this reversal of the voting 
rights between low-vote and high-vote class shareholders seems to be 
desirable. This is because it looks like the insiders holding high-vote stock in 
ParentCo now yield their majority voting power to low-vote stockholders, 
and thus the disparity between ownership and voting control is attenuated.115 
However, the reversal of the voting power is not as apparent as it looks. This 
is because of the SpinCo’s post-spin-off conversion provision in the charter. 
While the post-spin-off allocation of voting rights in SpinCo shown in Table 
3 above is not factually inaccurate, the allocation is temporary and misleading 
because of a charter provision on high-to-low conversion for transfer.  
Both the ParentCo’s and SpinCo’s high-vote Class B common stock are 
not listed on stock exchanges. Only their low-vote Class A common stock are 
publicly tradable on the New York Stock Exchange.116 For those who want 
to trade their high-vote Class B stock, only two options are available. First, 
they can transfer their high-vote stock only to or among the “Permitted 
Transferees,” who are closely related to the high-vote Class B stockholders 
as defined in the charter.117 The violation of this restriction of transfer would 
automatically convert the high-vote Class B stock into low-vote Class A 
stock.118 Second, they can convert their high-vote Class B stock into the low-
vote Class A stock on a share-for-share basis. They can then transfer low-
vote Class A stock on the stock exchange.119 In either case, the high-vote 
Class B stock converts into the low-vote Class A stock on transfer, either 
voluntarily or involuntarily, if the fellow high-vote Class B stockholders do 
not agree to that transfer. The result is that the transferor’s voting rights in 
SpinCo will be reduced from ten votes to one vote per share.  
Who, then, holds the high-vote Class B stock in SpinCo? Due to the equal 
distribution requirement in ParentCo’s charter, not only high-vote Class B 
stockholders in ParentCo but also low-vote Class A stockholders in ParentCo 
                                                 
115 Id. at 4. (“By virtue of the spin off, there will be a greater concentration of voting 
power in Hamilton Beach Holding among the holders of NACCO Class A Common than 
such holders have in NACCO and a corresponding reduction in the concentration of voting 
power in Hamilton Beach Holding among the holders of NACCO Class B Common.”).  
116 Id. at 4. (“Like the NACCO [the ParentCo] Class B Common, our [the SpinCo’s] 
Class B Common will not be listed on the NYSE or any other stock exchange, and we do not 
expect any trading market for our Class B Common to exist.”). 
117 Hamilton Beach, Corporate Charter Article 4. Section 3. 4. (a) (i). 
118 Id.  
119 Hamilton Beach, Registration Statement, at 4. (“If you want to sell the equity interest 
represented by your shares of our Class B Common, you may convert those shares into an 
equal number of shares of our Class A Common at any time, without cost, and then sell your 
shares of our Class A Common.”).  
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received  high-vote Class B stock in SpinCo.120 Most of ParentCo’s low-vote 
Class A stockholders, however, tend to be more interested in the investment 
from trading rather than the control of the company. They must inevitably 
convert their high-vote Class B stock in SpinCo into low-vote Class A stock 
in SpinCo for transferability, despite the reduction in voting rights. By 
comparison, the insiders who initially were holding ParentCo’s high-vote 
Class B stock and were not as interested in trading as outside investors have 
an incentive to retain SpinCo’s high-vote Class B stock.  
If we reflect this conversion issue and assume that most of the high-vote 
Class B stock in SpinCo is owned by insiders (i.e., initial holders of 
ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stock), the allocation of voting rights between 
Class A and Class B stockholders in SpinCo would be significantly different 
from what the managers described in SpinCo’s registration statement. The 
ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stockholders, who used to have 75% voting 
rights in ParentCo in Table 2, still retain up to 62% voting rights in SpinCo, 
which is more than majority.  
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Total 325 100% 650 1,325 100% 
 
In other words, assuming that all high-vote Class B stock of SpinCo held 
by non-insiders converted to the low-vote Class A stock of SpinCo for the 
transferability, the ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stockholders may enjoy 
possibly up to 62% voting rights in SpinCo as shown in Table 4, with only 
23% of equity interests in the company. In contrast, ParentCo’s low-vote 
Class A stockholders, who used to have 25% voting rights in ParentCo, retain 
38% voting rights in SpinCo, which would be still minority in terms of voting 
power.121  
                                                 
120 See supra Part II.C.1.a.  
121 This issue was addressed as one of the risk factors in the New SpinCo’s registration 
statement. Hamilton Beach, Registration Statement, at 18. (“After the spin-off, holders of 
our [the SpinCo’s] Class A Common and holders of our [the SpinCo’s] Class B Common 
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Some might question why this situation poses a problem, given that 
ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stockholders’ voting rights decreased from 75% 
(in Table 2) to 62% (in Table 4) before and after the spin-off transaction. 
Others might argue that given that ParentCo already had a dual-class stock 
structure before the spin-off, the disparity between economic interests and 
voting rights in SpinCo is similar to what ParentCo shareholders contracted 
into.  
However, the real issue here involves vote dilution. Specifically, the 
concern is that the voting power that ParenCo’s low-vote Class A 
stockholders have in SpinCo will not be 77% (as alleged by the managers), 
but will instead be closer to 38%, due to the stock conversion provision. On 
the flip side, ParentCo’s high-vote Class B stockholders will maintain the 
majority of voting control in SpinCo close to 62% with much less equity 
interests of 23%. This actual change is possible because both ParentCo and 
SpinCo had a dual-class stock structure along with the conversion provision. 
In that sense, even though a dual-class stock structure was not a new 
implementation to the SpinCo, its existence itself substantially increased 
potential agency costs.  
Nevertheless, the degree of voting control in SpinCo by the insiders of 
ParentCo is not certain because it relies on the conversion rate of high-to-low 
vote stock. If significant numbers of high-vote stock in SpinCo held by the 
outside investors are dormant, it is still possible that the insiders’ voting rights 
do not sufficiently increase to become the majority in voting as quickly as the 
insider wants.  
d. SpinCo’s Governance Transformation through Spin-off  
As we discussed earlier in Part I.B.2., the current law grants ParentCo’s 
managers ample discretion in setting corporate governance arrangements of 
SpinCo’s charters without shareholder approval. On top of the voting rights 
reallocation discussed above in NACCO/HBB spin-off, ParentCo managers 
proactively exercised this discretion and unilaterally made additional changes 
to SpinCo’s charter provision. The SpinCo’s charter was largely modeled 
after ParentCo’s charter, but it implemented new anti-takeover provisions 
that ParentCo does not have (e.g., supermajority voting requirement,122 a 
                                                 
generally will vote together on most matters submitted to a vote of our stockholders. 
Consequently, as holders of our Class B Common convert their shares of our Class B 
Common into shares of our Class A Common, the relative voting power of the remaining 
holders of our Class B Common will increase.”).  
122 RESTATED CERTIFICATION OF INCORPORATION OF HAMILTON BEACH BRAND 
HOLDING COMPANY, Article V Section 3 & Section 4, Article VI, and Article VII.  
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limit on shareholder actions in written consent,123 limit on shareholders’ right 
to call a special meeting,124 limit on shareholders’ right to amend bylaws125).  
In particular, SpinCo made changes to ParentCo’s provision on dividend 
by adding one new paragraph at the end of the exact same wording to 
ParentCo's provision.126 The newly added part in SpinCo charter specifically 
states that spin-offs would be another exception to the equal distribution 
requirement in dividends:  
 
provided, further, that in the case of any other distribution of stock 
of any subsidiary of the Corporation that occurs after the date of 
the Spin-Off, shares of Class A common stock of such subsidiary 
may be distributed with respect to Class A Common Stock and 
shares of Class B common stock of such subsidiary may be 
distributed with respect to Class B Common Stock. (emphasis 
added).127 
 
Consequently, unlike ParentCo’s charter provision requiring an equal 
stock distribution to both high-vote and low-vote stockholders, the new 
SpinCo charter provision mandates that in the future low-vote Class A stock 
shall be distributed only to the Class A stockholders and high-vote Class B 
Stock shall be distributed only to the Class B stockholders. This same-kind 
                                                 
123 Id. Article VII (a).  
124 Id. Article VII (b). 
125 Id. Article VIII ("Article I, Sections 1, 3 and 8, Article II, Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 and 
Article VII of the Bylaws may not be amended or repealed by the stockholders, and no 
provision inconsistent therewith may be adopted by the stockholders, without the affirmative 
vote of the holders of at least 80% of the voting power of the outstanding Voting Stock, 
voting together as a single class.”).  
126 RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF NACCO INDUSTRIES, INC., Article 
Fourth. 6. (Mar. 31, 1993). 
127  RESTATED CERTIFICATION OF INCORPORATION OF HAMILTON BEACH BRAND 
HOLDING COMPANY, Article IV. Section 3. 6. The full text of the provision is as follows: 
[E]ach share of Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock shall be equal 
in respect of rights to dividends and other distributions in cash, stock or property of 
the Corporation, provided that in the case of dividends or other distributions payable 
in stock of the Corporation, including distributions pursuant to stock split-ups or 
divisions of stock of the Corporation which occur after the date of the Spin-
Off, only shares of Class A Common Stock shall be distributed with respect to 
Class A Common Stock and only shares of Class B Common Stock shall be 
distributed with respect to Class B Common Stock, and provided, further, that in 
the case of any other distribution of stock of any subsidiary of the Corporation that 
occurs after the date of the Spin-Off, shares of Class A common stock of such 
subsidiary may be distributed with respect to Class A Common Stock and shares of 
Class B common stock of such subsidiary may be distributed with respect to 
Class B Common Stock. 
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stock distribution requirement applies to a distribution of any subsidiary 
company’s stock after the spin-off. This charter provision explicitly and 
perpetually stopped the dilution of voting rights of the high-vote Class B 
stockholders.  
More importantly, due to this new provision on unequal distribution, the 
current allocation of voting rights between Class A and Class B stockholders 
is not final. Since the new SpinCo’s charter provision allows the board to 
make a heterogeneous stock distribution for different classes of stockholders 
in spin-off, it is possible that the high-vote Class B stockholders in SpinCo 
will get even greater voting rights in the future through subsequent spin-offs. 
In this way, the adoption of dual-class stock structure in SpinCo can enhance 
the insiders’ voting rights without any monitoring mechanism and magnifies 
the disparity between equity interests and voting rights. 
 As such, the managers of ParentCo unilaterally changed governance 
arrangements of SpinCo by implementing charter provisions that 
shareholders would have likely resisted if it were up for ParentCo’s 
shareholder vote for the amendment. Under the new governance 
arrangements, the rights and power of ParentCo stockholders seem to have 
fundamentally changed.  
2. Tax law: Analysis on the “Continuity of Interest” Requirement 
a. Interrupted Continuity   
Let us develop the discussion further by combining corporate issues 
arising from dual-class stock with tax law. The spin-off of HBB by NACCO 
was carefully designed to qualify as tax-free under Section 355 of the 
Code,128 which is supported by the legal opinion of NACCO’s legal counsel, 
McDermott, Will & Emery. 129  As demonstrated in Subpart B, dual-class 
structures exacerbate agency problems by creating discrepancies in 
shareholders’ voting rights before and after the spin-off. 130  If such 
discrepancies occur during an acquisitive reorganization, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, shareholders can voice their opinions through the shareholder 
approval process.131 However, there is no mechanism for shareholders to 
                                                 
128 Hamilton Beach Brand Holding Company, Registration Statement, supra note 104, 
at 6. 
129 Id., at Exhibit 8.1.  
130 See supra Subpart B. 
131 See H. Kirt Switzer & Gary B. Wilcox, Corporate Acquisitions – (A), (B), and (C) 
Reorganizations, 771-4th TAX MGMT. BNA US INCOME PORTF., I.D.6. (2017) (discussing 
shareholder approval in acquisitive reorganizations); CLAIRE HILL ET AL., MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS: LAW, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 35–38 (2016) (discussing the shareholder 
approval process in mergers and acquisitions).  
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monitor the governance disparity when it comes to a spin-off.132 
The rationale of the tax-free benefits for both an acquisitive 
reorganization, such as mergers and acquisitions, and divisive reorganization, 
such as spin-offs, is that those reorganizations are mere changes in corporate 
form.133 From a tax perspective, then, the question becomes whether those 
corporate reorganizations with significant governance changes could still be 
viewed as mere changes in form and thus deserving of tax-free benefits. This 
question boils down to the continuity of interest requirement by which the 
shareholders of the acquired corporation in a merger or acquisition or the 
parent company in a spin-off must maintain some equity portion in the 
continuing enterprise to gain tax-free status. 134  This Article claims that 
corporate governance changes (more specifically, voting right changes) via 
spin-off potentially interrupt the continuity of equity interest and thus may 
render the transaction a taxable event. 
As explained in II.C, the continuity of interest doctrine at issue requires 
the historic shareholders of ParentCo to continue to control all the resulting 
corporations. 135  This is a common requirement applicable to all tax-free 
reorganizations, including mergers and acquisitions and spin-offs.136 As to 
the quantitative standard to determine continuity of interest, several examples 
in the regulations indicate that a 50% equity interest should be sufficient in 
the case of acquisitive reorganizations, and the regulations for other types of 
reorganizations, including spin-offs, also refer to that standard.137  
The continuity of interest requirement has been criticized, however, as 
an insufficient criterion for a tax-free benefit.138 Part II.A. provides a broad, 
policy-level criticism, arguing that allowing tax-free benefits to spin-offs 
                                                 
132 See supra Part I.B.2. 
133 SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 803. 
134 See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1); MCMAHON, supra note 61, at 1173. 
135 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D); Gregory N. Kidder (Steptoe & Johnson LLP), Basics of 
Tax-Free Spin-Offs Under Section 355, 5 J. INT’L TAX’N 50, 55 (Nov. 2011) (“Where the 
spin-off involves a divisive “D” reorganization, there is an additional requirement that either 
[the parent company] or its shareholders control the spun off corporation immediately after 
the transaction.”). 
136 Treas. Reg. §§1.368-1(b), 1.355-2(c). 
137 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-(e)(2)(v) Ex. 1; Rev Proc. 77-37, 
1977-2 C.B. 568 (discussing the 50% benchmark for satisfying the continuity of interest 
requirement); Rev. Proc. 86-42, 1986-2 C.B. 722; STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL LATHROPE, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 403–04, 491–93 (9th ed. 2016) (discussing 
continuity of interest requirement in the context of acquisitive reorganizations and spin-offs).  
138 For a recent reform proposal that seeks to provide for an objective continuity of 
interest testing period and for efforts to narrow the scope of Section 355 so that it cannot be 
used to effectuate a tax-free sale of a subsidiary to a new economic group in avoidance of 
Congress desire to repeal the General Utilities doctrine, see Bret Wells, Reform of Section 
355,  65 AM. U. L. REV. 447 (2018). 
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encompassing significant governance changes is not a good tax policy. This 
Subpart further elaborates on the criticism based on the doctrinal analysis of 
the current rule applicable to the NACCO-HBB spinoff case.    
Commentators criticize that the continuity of interest requirement in 
general does not do enough to distinguish a corporate reorganization that 
deserves tax-deferred treatment from a regular sale that should be taxed 
currently in the context of mergers and acquisitions.139 Furthermore, when it 
comes to spin-offs, current law fails to ask deeper questions about the basic 
premise of the doctrine: whether a spin-off (or corporate reorganization more 
broadly) represents pure paper transactions for shareholders and mere 
changes in corporate form.140 There is no clear rule that requires the resulting 
corporations to preserve “the corporate identity” of historic ParentCo 
following a spin-off “in a real and meaningful way.”141 It merely requires 
historic ParentCo shareholders to receive more than about 50% of SpinCo’s 
instrument labeled “equity.”142 Almost any type of stock will serve as a valid 
distribution.143 SpinCo may distribute non-voting preferred stock to historic 
shareholders of ParentCo, who previously owned voting stock. In this case, 
the distribution will be treated as a sufficient equity interest in SpinCo when 
it comes to testing continuity of interest.144 Thus, any qualitative changes in 
the stock, such as the voting powers of historic shareholders or the corporate 
governance disparity between ParentCo and SpinCo, are not considered.145 
Current law is simply content with the technical continuity of interest as long 
as historic shareholders receive more than about 50% of equity interest in 
SpinCo.146  
But what if historic shareholders experienced a qualitative difference in 
equity before and after the spin-off? Are those continued interests really 
continuous? Is not the continuity interrupted if the intrinsic value of the equity 
interest has been altered significantly (with the exception of continuing a 
certain percentage ratio in both old and new corporations)?  
Tax law has not addressed this issue and does not consider any qualitative 
difference in stock, such as in shareholders’ rights and in corporate 
governance structure, emerging through spin-off transactions.147 To address 
                                                 
139 Blank, supra note 73, at 2. 
140 Id. at 24 (“Effectively, the doctrine judges whether a thing has been changed by 
looking to its owners rather than to the thing itself.”). 
141 See id. at 28.  
142 See id. at 41–42 and text accompanying supra note 73. 
143 See Blank, supra note 73, at 42. 
144 Id. 
145 See id.  
146 See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1); MCMAHON, supra note 61, at 1173. 
147  Blank, supra note 73, at 26 (quoting Monty Python: And Now for Something 
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this oversight, this Article argues that the continuity would be interrupted not 
only when historic shareholders fail to continue a certain percentage of 
ownership in SpinCo, but also when the intrinsic value of the equity interest, 
such as voting rights, has been substantially changed during reorganization.  
As the continuity of interest requirement is common throughout all types 
of corporate reorganizations, a similar observation by a tax scholar is found 
in the context of acquisitive reorganizations, such as mergers and 
acquisitions.148 Joshua Blank offers two scenarios where the continuity is 
disrupted and thus “shareholders” are required to recognize gains in the 
acquisitive reorganizations.149 The first scenario is when voting shareholders 
receive non-voting stock.150 Voting rights may carry a premium, because they 
represent the power to participate in the election of directors who make 
fundamental decisions affecting the strategic direction of the company. 151 
The second scenario is the disproportionate reduction in percentage interest 
measured by either vote or value.152 Inferring from other tax code sections on 
disproportionate reduction in interest, such disproportionate equity reduction 
is deemed to be engaged in a sale rather than a corporate reorganization.153 
Blank concludes that considering the change in the shareholders’ relative 
position as a shareholder following a merger or spin-off, neither scenario 
should qualify for the tax-free benefit.154 
This Article observes that such problems may be more serious with 
regard to spin-offs. This is because there exists no systematic shareholder 
monitoring process throughout the transaction, whereas shareholder approval 
is mandatory in acquisitive reorganizations. Blank’s critique is analogous to 
this Article’s inquiry into spin-offs inasmuch as both acquisitive and divisive 
reorganizations share the continuity of interest doctrine.155 Hence, Blank’s 
two scenarios to analyze the continuity of interest requirement are useful 
tools for analyzing the requirement in the context of spin-offs. 
Based on this finding, let us now return to the NACCO-HBB spin-off 
case, where the historic shareholders’ role and rights within the enterprises 
have changed significantly following a spin-off.156 The NACCO-HBB dual 
                                                 
Completely Different (1971) [VHS] Directed by I. MacNaughton. London: Columbia 
Pictures Co.).  
148 See Blank, supra note 73.  
149 Id. at 8.  
150 Id. at 43.  
151 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 91, at 594. 
152 Blank, supra note 73, at 8 (E.W. Scripps and Belo were spun off with dual-class stock 
in 2007). 
153 Id. at 62. 
154 Id. at 60. 
155 Id. at 14. 
156 Id. at 26. 
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stock example comes under both scenarios—distributing non-voting stock to 
historic voting shareholders and the disproportionate reduction in interest.157 
In other words, shareholders’ new stock in SpinCo is something completely 
different from that in ParentCo. Such a change may make the HBB spin-off 
something more than a mere change in form, leading to the conclusion that 
HBB shareholders should not qualify for the tax-free benefit.158   
We note that the above argument is contentious because its conclusion 
inevitably urges a fundamental overhaul of the continuity of interest rule. 
Indeed, the continuity of interest doctrine has failed to serve as an adequate 
means to distinguish between certain reorganizations that ought to receive 
tax-free benefits and other ordinary sales. 159  One of the reasons that the 
continuity of interest has failed to serve its purpose might be its unjustifiable 
obsession with the quantitative analysis of the continued equity. This 
approach disproves the effectiveness of the continuity of interest requirement, 
considering the fact that there has not been any meaningful report of any 
transactions that have failed to satisfy such requirement.160  
In sum, roughly 50% of historic shareholders’ equity interest in the 
aggregate thus far satisfies the continuity of interest requirement, regardless 
of whether the fundamental rights of shareholders continue before and after 
the spin-off.161 However, this traditional approach cannot solve more recent 
problems regarding spin-offs—i.e., significant change in the quality of 
historic shareholders’ voting power via dual-class stock.162 Thus, even if 
historic shareholders continue to hold a continuity of propriety interest, this 
Article argues that the continuity of propriety interest requirement might not 
be satisfied if their rights with regard to the stock have changed significantly. 
b. Dual-class Stock and Post-Distribution Continuity  
In Subpart 2.a., we examined the continuity of interest doctrine by taking 
a snapshot as of the closing date of the spin-off transaction. Now, let us 
examine whether such continuity remains during a certain period after the 
                                                 
157 Id. at 60–61. 
158 Ajay K. Mehrotra, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Materialism, 83 IND. L. J. 881, 
896 (2008). 
159 Id.; Blank, supra note 73, at 44–45. 
160 Id. at 44. 
161 Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, Effects of Recontracting on Shareholder Wealth, 
12 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 437, 439 (1983). 
162 See supra Part II.C.1. See also Wei Du, Essay on Anti-takeover Provisions and 
Corporate Spin-offs 3901 (May 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State 
University), http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations (discussing the change 
in corporate governance via spin-off more generally). 
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spin-off.163  
Current law and regulations require historic ParentCo shareholders to 
retain a continued equity interest in the ongoing enterprises not only before 
the distribution but also afterwards.164 This requirement remains the same as 
the pre-1998 regulations that required post-acquisition continuity for 
acquisitive reorganizations. 165  In 1998, the post-acquisition continuity 
requirement was abandoned, allowing Target shareholders to sell freely the 
acquired stock to third parties without violating the continuity of interest 
requirement. At the time there was discussion of whether the change should 
be extended to divisive reorganizations such as spin-offs. 166  Since then, 
however, neither the Treasury nor the IRS has announced a revised position 
on the continuity of interest requirement in the corporate divisive context.167 
Current law thus still requires both pre-distribution and post-distribution 
continuity of interest.168  
Specifically, Treasury Regulation § 1.355-2(c) dealing with continuity of 
interest primarily discusses pre-distribution sales, whereas Treasury 
Regulation § 1.355-2(d) dealing with the device limitation that prohibits 
shareholders from cashing out primarily discusses post-distribution sale.169 
The device regulation is considered “a particularly strong form of continuity 
of interest requirement with respect to post-distribution sale.”170 Furthermore, 
the continuity of interest requirement in Treasury Regulation § 1.355-2(c) 
broadly includes post-distribution sales in the issue of continuity of interest. 
It does not explicitly limit the issues to pre-distribution sales.171 Furthermore, 
Section 355(e) of the Code, which requires that spin-offs not be followed by 
any pre-arranged change-in-control (50% or more) of either ParentCo or 
SpinCo within a period beginning two years before the distribution and 
ending two years after the distribution, appears to reinforce the post-
distribution continuity of interest requirement.172  
                                                 
163  I.R.C. § 355(e); Blank, supra note 73, at 37; David F. Shores, Reexamining 
Continuity of Shareholder Interest in Corporate Divisions, 18 VA. TAX REV. 473, 480–486 
(1999).  
164 Id. at 486. 
165 SCHWARZ & LATHROPE, supra note 137, at 492 n.118.  
166 Id., at 492 n.118; Shores, supra note 163, at 475 (arguing that the revised regulations 
for acquisitive reorganizations should apply to divisive reorganizations as well). 
167 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-2(c),2(d). 
168 Id. 
169 Shores, supra note 163, at 497–498. 
170 Id. at 481. 
171 Id. 
172 I.R.C.§ 355(e), often called the “Morris Trust” rules, was enacted in 1997, followed 
several spin-merger deals where ParentCo extracted substantial cash proceeds by putting 
leverage on SpinCo. Congress thought that a spin-merger with a 50% change in ownership 
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Nonetheless, the interrupted continuity problem becomes more puzzling 
when we expand our analysis from a static snapshot of the continuity to a 
certain timeframe after the spin-off. Indeed, as explained above, the divisive 
reorganization rules have a more vigorous continuity of interest requirement 
than the acquisitive reorganization rules. However, the continuity of interest 
requirement for spin-offs attempted to eliminate the ownership change from 
historic shareholders to a third party, such as a spin-off followed by a merger 
with a third party, rather than addressing the ownership change within historic 
shareholders after spin-off.173 However, as in the NACCO-HBB case where 
conversion from Class B to Class A is anticipated, we are now faced with the 
latter form of ownership change that should also be considered in the context 
of post-distribution continuity of interest.  
Due to the lack of rules regarding this newly emerged form of post-
distribution ownership change, NACCO-HBB insiders argued that their spin-
off would not be taxed. They made this argument because it is not certain 
whether any increase in voting power in HBB by NACCO Class B 
shareholders by conversion is considered an “acquisition” after the spin-off 
that renders the transaction taxable.174 It is true that the regulations have not 
anticipated this new form of post-distribution ownership change not caused 
by a merger or acquisition with a third party, as in the NACCO-HBB case. 
However, it also seems questionable whether the law only intends to prohibit 
a shareholder sale to third parties and not those cases where the ownership 
change among existing shareholders enables insiders who were previously 
                                                 
or greater (measured by vote or value) looked more like a sale than a restructuring, and it 
thus concluded that it should not qualify for tax-free treatment if, as part of the plan of 
distribution, one or more persons acquires at least a 50% interest of either ParentCo stock or 
SpinCo stock. If that acquisition occurs within a period beginning two years before the 
distribution and ending two years after the distribution, it is presumed to be a part of the plan 
of distribution, i.e., spin-off. This essentially requires a 2-year pre-distribution and a 2-year 
post-distribution holding requirement for both ParentCo and SpinCo, which in effect 
reinforces the post-distribution continuity of interest requirement. Shores, supra note 163, at 
536–37. Today, there are a great number of regulations that try to define what is and what 
isn’t a prearranged transaction. 
173 Michael L. Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 
239, 272 (2003); George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Divisions, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 289, 296 
(2003).  
174 NACCO, Form S-1, at 7. The parties further argue that even if so, it does not cause 
50% or more changes triggering a taxable transaction under Section 355(e). However, a 50% 
or more requirement has been criticized severely because any post-distribution merger would 
easily avoid the requirement by making the smaller of the two merging corporations the 
surviving entity. Shores, supra note 163, at 537. If the parties arrange for the survival of the 
smaller of the two merging corporations, the shareholder of the smaller (or transferee) 
corporation would hold less than 50% of its stock following the merger and would be treated 
as having acquired less than 50% of the larger (or transferor) corporation’s stock. 
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unable to amend the charter to now turn the group into a supermajority that 
can amend the charter. This is exactly what we examined as the qualitative 
difference in equity before and after the spin-off in Subpart 2.a. This scenario 
violates the continuity of interest requirement and thus is not a mere 
reorganization that is entitled to tax-free treatment.175  
Notably, a recent IRS Revenue Procedure and private letter ruling seem 
to approve a spin-off transaction harnessing dual-class stock structure.176 The 
ruling provides tax-free benefits to a transaction where the public ParentCo 
distributes the high-vote stock to the public and retains the low-vote stock, 
which is then used to redeem existing debt to a creditor.177 The ruling in 
principle requires a company to maintain the dual-class structure for 24 
months or more after the spin-off. 178  A significant exception to this 
requirement, however, is that SpinCo may unwind the dual-class structure 
within 24 months if it merges with a third-party acquirer. This unwinding can 
take place as long as there were no negotiations during the 24-month period 
prior to the distribution, and as long as no more than 20% of the interest in 
vote or value is acquired by any existing shareholder who owns more than 
20% of stock in vote or value.179 These “safe harbors” for unwinding a dual-
class structure reiterate the safe harbors in Revenue Procedure 2016-40.  
A practitioner interprets this ruling as the IRS basically blessing the dual-
class structure for tax-free spin-offs.180 However, such an interpretation of 
the IRS’ position may be overly positive and perhaps misleading. First, the 
Revenue Procedure limited its discussion on the 80% control requirement 
when the SpinCo adopts dual-class stock which ParentCo distributes in a 
transaction that otherwise qualifies the remaining requirements under Section 
355 of the Code. Second, the ruling at issue involves a creditor for whom the 
low-vote class stock is to be used to redeem the ParentCo’s debt, so it makes 
sense to require maintaining dual-class structure for certain periods of time 
after the spin-off to protect the interests of high-vote shareholders of 
                                                 
175 Yin, supra note 173, at 296. Yin briefly mentions that the ownership change among 
the existing shareholders does not disqualify the transaction by illustrating the situation 
where ParentCo shareholders receive SpinCo stock proportionally when SpinCo stock is 
distributed, which is obviously a different context from the discussion in this paper. Id. at 
297. 
176 Rev. Proc. 2016-40, 2016 32 I.R.B. 228; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201731004 (Feb. 16, 
2017). 
177 The creditor immediately sells those low-vote stock to unrelated third parties in 
public of private offerings. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201731004, 7 (Feb. 16, 2017). 
178 Id. at 9.  
179 Id. 
180 See generally Alston & Bird, Federal Tax Advisory: Dual-Class Stock Blessed for 
Spin (Sep. 1, 2017), available at https://www.alston.com/-
/media/files/insights/publications/2017/08/dualclass-stock.pdf. 
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ParentCo.181 Moreover, both Revenue Procedure and the ruling describe the 
fact patterns of ownership change between shareholders and a third party 
after the spin-off, with which the extant rule is familiar.   
Therefore, it is likely more proper to note that neither the IRS nor the 
Treasury have noticed the potential problems with continuity of interest 
arising from the ownership change between historic shareholders derived 
from dual-class stock. We urge the IRS to consider this issue, as discussed 
further in Part III.C. More fundamentally, it is necessary to update the rule to 
consider post-distribution continuity within historic shareholders.    
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS  
In this Part, we propose legal solutions to the problems we have identified 
above. As what we believe is the first paper to integrate corporate and tax law 
considerations simultaneously on the issue, we argue that neither corporate 
nor tax laws have caught up with the evolution of spin-off practice in the real 
world. This gap between law and practice creates an unexpected legal 
loophole that solicits agency problems. In particular, managers’ unfettered 
discretion in modifying corporate governance arrangements in spin-offs 
needs to be checked, and both corporate law and tax law can play that role by 
making necessary changes to the current framework.  
A. Constructive Cooperation of Corporate Law and Tax Law  
 Spin-offs are corporate law transactions, but the completion of spin-offs 
is often conditioned on obtaining tax-free treatment of those spin-offs. Given 
that both corporate law and tax law are key elements of spin-off transactions, 
a cooperative solution of corporate law and tax law would provide more 
holistic normative policy implications for the unique problem (i.e., unilateral 
governance changes) revealed earlier in this Article. 
 A potential concern for invoking tax law to address the problems relating 
to changes in voting rights through spin-offs is that tax law is an imperfect 
instrument for addressing agency costs incurred by managers.182 Although 
there are some topics that policymakers may seek in order to correct problems 
in corporate governance and managerial opportunism,183 there is significant 
                                                 
181 If not, a third party that acquires a low-vote stock may unwind the dual-class structure 
immediately after the tax-free spin-off, which would harm the voting rights of the high-vote 
shareholders of ParentCo. 
182  David M. Schizer, Tax and Corporate Governance: The Influence of Tax on 
Managerial Agency Costs, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE 1 (Jeffery N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., July 2015), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2501706. 
183 For example, there are certain tax rules to discourage pyramidal business structure 
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hesitation to introduce tax law as a tool to mitigate the problems in non-tax 
areas.184  Despite the general reluctance of using tax law as a tool for non-tax 
problems, there are in fact only a few examples of literature by tax scholars 
particularly discussing the efficacy of tax law influencing corporate 
governance. 185  As Schizer has provided, it might be due to the fact that 
neither tax experts nor corporate experts usually have detailed knowledge of 
the other field to embark on the interdisciplinary research.186 Moreover, it is 
difficult to find any substantial discussion about tax-free reorganizations and 
managerial agency costs, with the exception of Schizer’s admission that 
managers might not always be faithful to shareholders when they plan tax-
oriented corporate structuring, and that it is difficult for shareholders to 
monitor whether managers are pursuing shareholders’ interests or their own 
due to the cryptic tax law and competing considerations.187 However, instead 
of offering further analysis, Schizer concludes that the “influence of tax on 
corporate governance—tax structuring that camouflages self-interested deal 
terms—is new to the academic literature.”188  
We have demonstrated that the change in voting rights through spin-offs 
is a good example of how managers may disguise their self-interested 
corporate restructuring in the esoteric corporate reorganization processes.189 
Most importantly for managers’ purposes, the restructuring should be a 
divisive reorganization, such as spin-off, to block shareholder monitoring and 
to avoid realizing any taxable gain. To address this problem, we argue that 
not only corporate law but also tax law should exert such efforts. Given that 
sophisticated managers already take advantage of tax law to camouflage their 
                                                 
and excessive golden parachutes and to encourage performance-based compensation. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999, 162(m).   
184 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. L. 
REV. 1673 (2015) (arguing that corrective taxation may not efficiently address various 
negative externalities caused by different agents); Giorgia Maffini & John Vella, Evidence-
based Policy Making? The Commission’s Proposal for an FTT 20 (Oxford University Centre 
for Business Taxation, WP 15/15, 2015) (opposing the Financial Transaction Tax introduced 
to deter transactions that do not enhance market efficiency because it does not distinguish 
“bad” transactions from “good” transactions).  
185 See, e.g., Noam Noked, Can Taxes Mitigate Corporate Governance Inefficiencies?, 
9 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 221, 224 (2017) (arguing that tax law has limited ability to 
“effectively mitigate corporate governance problems and increase efficiency”); Schizer, 
supra note 182, at 2 (contending that “tax is a poor fit” to tackle corporate governance 
problems due to the lack of expertise by tax authorities); Richard M. Hynes, Taxing Control, 
38 J. CORP. L. 567, 584 (2013) (implying that introducing the corrective tax on the firm 
control would be inefficient, but in a less critical way). 
186 Schizer, supra note 182, at 1. 
187 Id. at 20. 
188 Id. at 21. 
189 See supra Part II.C. 
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self-interested corporate deal terms, it is less convincing to maintain 
antipathy toward tax law in addressing corporate problems.  
Furthermore, the concern of scholars who disapprove of using tax law as 
a tool to address corporate issues perhaps reflects the imposition of “uniform 
and mandatory rules” that have poorly tailored scope and result in unintended 
negative effects.190 By contrast, what we propose in this Article is to revoke 
the tax-free benefits for certain restructuring transactions and to revert to the 
default rule where those transactions would have realized taxable gain, 
provided that those transactions are likely to be used as camouflage for 
managerial entrenchment. Corporate law would be the most direct instrument 
to challenge this issue, but tax law might be used as an additional stick by 
revoking the exceptional tax-free benefit in such unusual situations. It is not 
persuasive for tax law to neglect an issue essential to one of its established 
requirements for tax-free reorganization, i.e., continuity of interest. Hence, 
we expect that tax authorities’ willingness to closely examine the problem 
will facilitate a more fundamental action by other agencies in charge of 
managerial entrenchment. Encouraging the constructive cooperation between 
the two agencies will eventually fill the gap between tax law and managerial 
agency costs in corporate law.   
B. Corporate Law:  Need for Shareholder Approval Requirement 
Once ParentCo managers unilaterally amend a SpinCo charter deviating 
from ParentCo’s charter, it becomes extremely difficult for low-vote 
shareholders to reverse the amendment. The low-vote shareholders’ voting 
rights to amend corporate charters face two large, perhaps insurmountable, 
hurdles. First, state corporate laws mandate that only directors have a right to 
initiate a charter amendment. Shareholders can only vote on what directors 
propose and do not have the power to initiate a charter amendment process 
no matter how desirable they find one. 191  Second, especially when their 
voting power has been substantially diluted through the use of dual-class 
stock as discussed in the NACCO-HBB case in Part II.C., shareholders may 
no longer have the requisite voting control to dictate or influence the outcome. 
For instance, if the manager and the insiders have more than 50% of the 
voting power through dual-class stock, the public shareholders will be simply 
out of luck in being able to have any meaningful say in the corporate 
                                                 
190 Schizer, supra note 182, at 4–6; Noked, supra note 185, at 263 (opposing the use of 
corrective tax to reduce agency costs from entrenchment because it is hard to assess the 
benefit and cost associated with the tax); Hynes, supra note 185, at 569–70 (implying that 
introducing the corrective tax on the firm control would be inefficient in a less critical way). 
191 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 8, § 242. 
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governance arrangement.192 
1. Limit of Ex-Post Mechanisms  
As such, unilaterally amended charter provisions are extremely difficult 
for shareholders to remove and ParentCo’s shareholders can think of their 
freedom to sell their stock if they are dissatisfied with the new corporate 
governance arrangements of SpinCo. Although the right to sell stock is 
unconstrained, the stockholders may be forced to sell it at a depressed price 
when the distributed stock comes with a suboptimal governance structure. 
Since shareholders have to bear the loss from the depressed stock price, being 
able to sell the stock itself is not a reasonable option for the dissatisfied 
shareholders. As a result, this option may provide little or no deterrence 
against managers’ adoption of suboptimal governance regime through spin-
offs.  
 When shareholders choose not to sell their stock, traditionally the 
shareholders can express their dissatisfaction by exercising their voting rights 
or by bring a suit against managers. But in companies with dual-stock 
structure, the majority voting power is held by the insiders and often it is 
impossible to obtain enough votes to remove directors or pass shareholder 
proposals.  
Another possible mechanism for shareholders is to bring a shareholder 
lawsuit against managers who changed governance structure. In corporate 
spin-offs, managers have the unfettered discretion in deciding 1) whether to 
divide a company into separate entities (“business decision”); and 2) how to 
set up a corporate governance structure of a new SpinCo separated from 
ParentCo (“governance decision”). Exempting spinoffs from shareholder 
voting is intended to maximize the efficiency of a “business decision.” But 
                                                 
192  It is worth noting that the Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), the most 
influential proxy advisory firm, made a new voting guideline on unilateral bylaw/charter 
amendments in 2014. The guideline recommends that shareholders vote against directors 
who become involved with unilateral bylaw/charter amendments that could adversely impact 
shareholders after IPO. The fact that the ISS takes the potential risk of unilateral 
bylaw/charter amendment is welcoming, but the ISS’s guideline has its own limitation to 
monitor unilateral charter amendments made through spin-offs. After all, the ISS only deals 
with a post-IPO charter amendment—but SpinCo’s charter is technically neither an IPO 
charter nor a post-IPO charter. There has been no incidence of the ISS’s negative voting 
recommendation based on unilateral charter amendment through spin-offs yet. Also, most 
companies that could significantly amend charters through spin-offs have controlling 
shareholders who already exercise a significant voting control. Thus, they are relatively less 
influenced by institutional shareholders’ vote and largely guided by proxy advisors instead, 
including the ISS. See ISS, United States Proxy Voting Guidelines, Benchmark Policy 
Recommendations 14 (2018), available at 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346805 
52 Insulation by Separation [27-Feb-19 
 
 
when such special treatments extend to “governance decisions,” particularly 
implementing a dual-class structure in SpinCo, unexpected agency costs may 
arise. Thus, under current corporate law regime, both decisions are bundled 
and subject to the business judgement rule (“BJR”) presumption in favor of 
managers’ actions.193  
Possibly, despite the BJR protection, low-vote shareholders still can 
bring a suit against managers or high-vote shareholders regarding spin-offs 
based on the breach of duty of loyalty. 194  The fiduciary duty of loyalty 
mandates that fiduciaries act in the best interests of shareholders rather than 
their own interests. 195  Even if ParentCo managers’ discretion to declare 
dividends and set SpinCo’s charter provisions has been generally protected 
by the business judgment rule, these managers are still subject to the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty owed to ParentCo’s shareholders.196Thus, when the managers’ 
declaration of dividends becomes an obvious conflict of interest, the 
managers may become liable for violating the fiduciary duty of loyalty.  
Nonetheless, these types of shareholder litigation have been extremely rare, 
and spin-offs have been strongly regarded as business decisions as a whole. 
Thus, the court needs to discern “business decisions” and “governance 
decisions” elements in spin-offs and limit the business judgment protection 
only to the “business decisions” element. The court may then monitor 
management’s unilateral governance changes under the heightened judicial 
scrutiny, as courts do in other contexts of corporate law, even when those 
changes do not necessarily violate the fiduciary duty of loyalty.    
2. Benefits of Ex-Ante Shareholder Approval  
 As discussed above, once management unilaterally adopts management-
empowering provisions (including anti-takeover provisions) in corporate 
charters, it may be nearly impossible for shareholders to reverse those charter 
provisions by using their rights under the current corporate law regime. Thus, 
we need to turn to possible new legal constraints against management’s 
discretion in spin-offs. More direct and meaningful checks on the managerial 
opportunism in governance changes through spin-offs may be imposed by 
requiring a shareholder vote for certain spin-off transactions. Currently 
shareholders do not have any right to vote on a spin-off decision made by 
                                                 
193 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). 
194  The Delaware Supreme Court confirmed that corporate officers owe the same 
fiduciary duty as directors. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A. 2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
195 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), Weinberger v. 
UOP Inc., 456 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983), aff’d, 497A. 2d 792 (Del. 1985).   
196  The fiduciary duty is owed only to shareholders of ParentCo, not to SpinCo 
shareholders or potential investors.  
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management. This voting right differs from the shareholders’ voting rights to 
amend corporate charter in the sense that voting requirement for a spin-off 
itself can be an ex-ante preventive mechanism to management’s unilateral 
governance changes. 
 Shareholder approval requirement would mitigate agency costs that 
could arise from the potential managerial entrenchment associated with their 
unilateral governance changes. In order to obtain a shareholder approval, 
managers may not propose antitakeover provisions unless there is a 
convincing need for the change. Thus, the existence of shareholder approval 
requirement itself has an ex-ante deterrence effect on the entrenching 
governance changes. Along with this benefit, a shareholder approval 
requirement may incur some costs such as the delay in completing a spin-off 
transaction in order to obtain shareholder approval separately, the costs 
associated with shareholder vote process, or the risk of remaining with less 
efficient governance arrangements when managers fail to obtain shareholder 
approval.  
 These costs, however, would not be prohibitively high compared to the 
benefits, because the requirement does not ban managers’ changes entirely, 
but constraints to a certain degree. If the proposed changes increase 
shareholder value, a managers’ proposal to amend organizational documents 
would be more compelling to shareholders and more likely to get shareholder 
approval. Also, the shareholder approval would not unevenly constraint spin-
offs, but rather align governance changes during spin-offs with those of the 
other context of corporate law because Managers have enjoyed the over-
inclusive privilege in making governance changes during spin-offs.  
There are multiple ways to implement a shareholder approval 
requirement for spin-offs. First, we can require shareholder voting when the 
relative size of the spun-off company is substantially large. This is similar, in 
spirit, to excusing a shareholder vote in a merger transaction when the 
acquiring company issues less than 20% of the outstanding stock.197 In a spin-
off, given that a new stock is being distributed to the ParentCo shareholders, 
the law will instead have to examine the relative valuations of ParentCo and 
SpinCo. The law will require a ParentCo shareholder to vote when SpinCo 
constitutes a large fraction of the combined valuation. Second, we can impose 
a shareholder vote in case the governance arrangements of the SpinCo in its 
charter are substantially different from the ParentCo’s.  
Activist shareholders may have a particular role to play in exercising 
shareholder power. Those who have enough capital to threaten managers of 
a target company have a virtual shareholder approval right. For instance, 
when Darden announced a business plan to spin-off Red Lobster, the activist 
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hedge fund Starboard opposed the spin-off plan.198 After Darden ignored this 
opposition, Starboard initiated a proxy fight to turn over the entire board 
members of Darden. 199  As such, powerful individual and institutional 
investors can effectively constrain managerial discretion by overcoming the 
collective action problems associated with shareholder action and ensure 
managerial accountability in the spin-off context.  
C. Tax Law: Revisit Continuity of Interest Requirement 
In addition to the attempt to address the problem in corporate law, this 
Article proposes that tax law should support such an attempt. The Article 
proposes that tax law should do so by disqualifying certain spin-off 
transactions with material changes in corporate governance structures from 
tax-free treatment by way of considering both the quantity and quality of 
interest when it applies the continuity of interest requirement. Specifically, 
the Article urges the IRS to consider issuing a letter ruling or guidance on 
certain spin-offs with material changes in corporate governance for the 
recently introduced 18-month pilot program on spin-offs, effective until 
March 21, 2019.200  
1. Time to Revisit Continuity of Interest 
The continuity of interest requirement in spin-offs is a simple reiteration 
of that requirement in mergers and acquisitions. It has not been revisited since 
the regulations on the continuity of interest were amended in 1998 with 
respect to acquisitive reorganizations. 201  However, there are many 
differences between acquisitive reorganizations and divisive reorganizations 
both in corporate law and tax law. As a result, referring to or applying the 
rules for the continuity of interest requirement for acquisitive reorganizations 
                                                 
198 Siddharth Cavale & Varun Aggarwal, Starboard Wants to Put Darden’s Red Lobster 
Spinoff Plan to Vote, REUTERS, (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-darden-
starboard/starboard-wants-to-put-dardens-red-lobster-spinoff-plan-to-vote-
idUSBREA1N1MT20140224. Since there is no mandatory shareholder approval 
requirement for spin-offs, Starboard was seeking to “solicit support for a non-binding 
resolution urging the Darden board not to approve a Red Lobster separation.” (emphasis 
added).  
199 Alexandra Stevenson, Activist Hedge Fund Starboard Succeeds in Replacing Darden 
Board, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 10, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/activist-
hedge-fund-starboard-succeeds-in-replacing-darden-board/ (“Before the shareholder 
meeting on the spinoff, Darden’s board abruptly made a deal in May to sell Red Lobster for 
$2.1 billion to Golden Gate Capital. The move infuriated shareholders led by Starboard, 
which immediately embarked on a campaign to try to replace Darden’s directors.”).   
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to divisive reorganization has various conceptual and practical limitations.202  
The agency problem arising from the corporate governance discrepancy 
between ParentCo and SpinCo examined in this Article illustrate such 
problems. Taxpayers not only create agency problem in corporate law but 
also enjoy tax-free benefits by taking advantage of outdated tax rules 
regarding the continuity of interest requirement. Thus, we urge the tax 
authorities to consider newly emerged problems in relation to the continuity 
of interest requirement. 
2. The IRS Pilot Program on Spin-offs 
One way for tax authorities to review the newly emerged problems and 
revisit continuity of interest requirement is the private letter ruling process. 
Having limited resources, however, the IRS tends not to issue private letter 
rulings or determination letters on transactions with a large number of 
complex data points.203 It is too costly for the IRS to review hundreds of 
pages of financial reports to come to a decision.204 Spin-offs are among the 
transactions for which the IRS has a no-rule stance because the agency 
considers that some cases surrounding spin-offs may be too fact-intensive for 
the agency to issue a ruling.205 The agency further hesitates to incorrectly 
signal to the market that issuing a ruling on certain type of deals implies the 
agency’s blessing on them.206  
However, since spin-offs have become a topic of much discussion 
between corporations and the IRS in recent years, the IRS has slowly been 
opening up its corporate ruling programs in the past year. For example, 
Revenue Procedure 2016-40 lifted its ban on private letter ruling requests 
with respect to the control requirement when dual-class structure is involved. 
The document offered safe harbors for unwinding the dual-class structure 
                                                 
202 Yin, supra note 173, at 298. 
203 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2013-3, 2013-1 I.R.B. 113; Rev. Proc. 2013-32, 2013-28 I.R.B. 
55; Rev. Proc. 2015-43, 2015-40 I.R.B. 467; Laura Davison, IRS Outlines Rules for M&A 
Activity Surrounding Spinoffs, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) (Dec. 19, 2016).  
204 Laura Davison, 'No Rule' Spinoffs Aren’t Necessarily 'Nefarious,' IRS Official, DAILY 
TAX REP. (BNA) (May 13, 2017).  
205 Rev. Proc. 2017–3, Sec. 1.01, 2017-1 I.R.B. 130; Rev. Rul. 2017-09, 2017-21 I.R.B. 
1244; Davison, supra note 204. The IRS does not issue rulings or determination letters if, 
for example, the problems involved are inherently factual in nature, and instead releases a 
list of specific areas with no ruling stance. It further releases a list of certain areas in which 
(i) rulings or determination letters will not ordinarily be issued, (ii) the IRS is temporarily 
not issuing rulings or determination letters because those matters are “under study,” and (iii) 
the IRS will not ordinarily issue rulings because it has provided automatic approval 
procedures for these matters.  Rev. Proc. 2017–3, Sec. 2.01, 2017-1 I.R.B. 130. 
206 Davison, supra note 204. 
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after the distribution.207 On July 14, 2016, the IRS released proposed rules on 
device and active trade or business requirements under Section 355 – i.e., 
whether a spin-off is a device of distributing earnings and profits to 
shareholders, which could make the deal taxable, and whether the spin-off 
has a valid business purpose.208 It subsequently released Revenue Procedure 
2016-45, providing that it would accept ruling requests on the device and 
active trade or business requirements under Section 355.209 Furthermore, in 
May 2017, the IRS released two sets of guidance to resume issuing rulings. 
First, Revenue Ruling 2017-09 provided that the IRS would issue rulings on 
so-called “north-south transactions,” in which a parent co. (P)’s property is 
transferred to its subsidiary (D) in exchange of the subsidiary (D)’s share, 
followed by a distribution by the subsidiary (D) of the stock of its controlled 
subsidiary (C) to P.210 Second, Revenue Procedure 2017-38 lifted the ruling 
restrictions on transactions involving debt issued in anticipation of a spin-
off.211  
Finally, on September 21, 2017, the IRS introduced a pilot program 
(“Pilot Program”) in which it is willing to issue letter rulings on full spin-off 
transactions generally for the next 18 months.212 The Pilot Program expires 
on March 21, 2019, but taxpayers may now obtain rulings on various issues 
involved in spin-offs that have not been previously available. The agency 
explained the change of position as an attempt to provide a better view into 
what types of deals are happening in the marketplace.213 The IRS also seemed 
to worry that a no-rule position on certain types of transaction implied that 
such transactions were nefarious, resulting in a chilling effect.214 This Pilot 
Program is a great opportunity for the IRS to consider newly emerged 
problems in relation to the continuity of interest requirement. 
Unfortunately, however, there is no sign of efforts to update or discuss 
the outdated continuity of interest doctrine in the course of the recent 
developments. The continuity of interest requirement has not been revisited 
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since the regulations on the continuity of interest were amended in 1998 with 
respect to acquisitive reorganizations. 215  Furthermore, there are many 
differences between acquisitive reorganizations and divisive reorganizations 
both in corporate law and tax law. As a result, referring to or applying the 
rules for the continuity of interest requirement for acquisitive reorganizations 
to divisive reorganization has various conceptual and practical limitations.216 
The agency problem arising from the corporate governance discrepancy 
between ParentCo and SpinCo examined in this Article illustrate such 
problems. Taxpayers not only create agency problem in corporate law but 
also enjoy tax-free benefits by taking advantage of outdated tax rules 
regarding the continuity of interest requirement. Thus, we urge the IRS to 
consider adding newly emerged problems in relation to the continuity of 
interest issue to the new list of rulings in the Pilot Program. 
3. A Task After the Pilot Program 
Although the end of the Pilot Program approaches, there are 
unfortunately no sign of efforts to update or discuss the outdated continuity 
of interest doctrine in the course of the recent developments. Part of the 
reason is that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 brought major tax reforms 
during the Pilot Program so that the majority of the resources in the IRS have 
been reverted to many topics that the TCJA is focused on, including a large 
corporate rate cut and an array of individual tax cuts and increases.217 As a 
result, the attention to the Pilot Program has faded away compared to the start 
of the Program.  
However, there is a silver lining. While wrapping up the result of the 
Pilot Program at the end of 2018, the IRS plans to provide a modified and 
combined Revenue Procedure for private letter rulings on spin-offs.218 In the 
new Revenue Procedure, the IRS expects to make the Pilot Program 
permanent, meaning that it will continue to consider full transactional rulings 
in addition to its significant issue rulings on spinoffs.219 Thus, we once again 
urge the IRS to consider adding newly emerged problems in relation to the 
continuity of interest issue to the new list of rulings on spin-offs.  
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As one of the first research articles that reveals a potentially toxic 
interplay between governance changes and corporate spin-offs, focusing on 
dual-class stock adoption as an extreme form of corporate governance change, 
this Article claims that purported justifications for giving the managers of 
ParentCo unfettered authority to choose SpinCo’s governance arrangements 
are significantly attenuated. As a solution, the Article offers cooperative 
measures between corporate law and tax law. Since the assumption  for the 
special treatments of corporate spin-offs—no fundamental changes before 
and after a spin-off—have been deviated by managers over time, a legal 
prescription for state corporate laws and federal tax laws on corporate spin-
offs should evolve accordingly. From a corporate law perspective, the Article 
proposes a shareholder approval requirement for corporate spin-offs when a 
spin-off company is sizable or when a spin-off results in corporate charter 
amendments. Meanwhile, tax law needs to revisit the continuity of interest 
requirement to confirm whether a spin-off with corporate governance 
changes still meets this requirement. Furthermore, this Article offers new 
insights to a long-standing debate on dual-class stock by explaining how 
dual-class stock may be vulnerable to agency problems when it meets actual 
corporate deals.  
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